14.773 Political Economy of Institutions and Development.
Lecture 1: Introduction and Overview

Daron Acemoglu

MIT

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Introduction

- What is this course about?
  - Political economy
  - Economic development
  - Their intersection and interaction

Why?

- Much of economics takes preferences, technology and *institutions* (market structure, laws, regulations, policies) as given.
- Thus institutions matter in the same way as preferences do.
- But in general, in the background
- Increasing body of evidence that for understanding economic development both over time and across countries, we need to understand *institutional differences*.
- For example, growth accounted by human capital, physical capital and "technology". But where do these come from?

The Challenge of Institutions

- Suppose institutions matter (not a minor supposition, but see the evidence later in this lecture).

  - Imagine for example that different laws and regulations, different political systems have a major effect on investment, education and allocation decisions and thus on economic development.

- But why do societies choose different institutions?

- And what are institutions anyway?

What Are Institutions

- Loosely defined in general.
  - Could be anything.
  - The challenge is to find a good workable and useful definition.

- Douglass North: role of institutions as "to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction."

- But what does this mean?

- Question: what is the difference between institutions and organizations?

Institutions: A First Definition

- Let us take another definition from Douglass North as a starting point:

    "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."

- Key points: institutions are
    - are humanly devised
    - set constraints
    - shape incentives

- Economic institutions→ economic rules of the game (property rights, contracting institutions)
- Political institutions→ political rules of the game (democracy versus dictatorship, electoral laws, constraints)
- Not perfect, but will become clearer in the context of well-defined formal models.

How to Model Institutions?

- This is a key question for this course.
- Ideal approach:
  - good approximation to reality and the forces shaping institutional differences
  - amenable to formal theoretical and econometric analysis

Some Approaches

1. *Efficient institutions view*: Society or the economic agents will choose whichever set of institutions and regulations will maximize the size of the "pie".

2. *The Social conflict view:* Institutions emerge as a result of economic agents' *conflicting preferences*. They are not necessarily efficient.
   North: there is a: "persistent tension between the ownership structure which maximizes the rents to the ruler (and his group) and an efficient system that reduces transaction costs and encourages economic growth".
   Why are institutions not "efficient"? Notion of efficiency: Pareto efficiency? Growth maximizing?
   Major barrier to efficiency: *commitment problems*.

3. *The ideology/beliefs view:* Different institutions chosen as a result of different beliefs. But where do beliefs come from?

4. *The incidental institutions view:* Institutions emerge as a byproduct of other interactions. *Historical accidents.*

Institutions and Political Economy

- Political economy intimately related to the *social conflict view*, but not excluding rich interactions with the other views.
  - How are conflicting preferences of different agents aggregated?
  - How do political institutions affect aggregation?
  - How do conflicting preferences over outcomes imply *conflicting preferences over institutions*?
  - How are different preferences over institutions resolved?

- Much on this course will be about trying to develop models and language for investigating these issues.

Institutions: Formal Versus Informal

- Formal institutions, for example, whether the country in question has a Supreme Court, separation of power, parliamentary system etc.

- Informal institutions, which determine how a given set of formal rules and informal institutions function in practice. For example, many Latin American countries have a presidential system similar to the U.S., but in practice, they have very different "political institutions".

- Example: Supreme Court under FDR and Juan Perón (see below).

- But informal institutions should not be used as a "catchall". We have to understand why a given set of formal rules imply different outcomes in different societies.

- Related question: what is the difference between informal institutions, social norms and culture?

Political Power

- How are conflicting preferences reconciled?
- *Political power*.
- In the case of South Africa the resolution of social conflict was simple: whites could vote and determine the law, blacks could not.
  - The major issue for the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State at the foundation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 was to stop Africans voting, and similarly this became the basis of the Apartheid regime after the founding of the Union of South Africa.
- Whites have more political power because it is their preferences that count.

De Jure vs. De Facto Political Power

- Distinguish between two different types of political power: *de jure* and *de facto* political power.
  - De jure political power is allocated by political institutions (such as constitutions or electoral systems)
  - De facto political power emerges from the ability to engage in collective action, use brute force, paramilitaries, armies, or other channels such as lobbying or bribery.
- Equilibrium outcomes (institutions/policies) will be an outcome of total political power, which consists of the composition of these two sources of power.
- De facto political power useful for understanding why formal institutions function differently in different environments.

De Facto Power in Action: Perón and Menem

- When Perón was first democratically elected president in 1946 the Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional an attempt to create a new national labor relations board. Perón sought the impeachment of 4 of the 5 members of the Court. In the end 3 were removed and the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate supported this.

- The 1946 impeachment established a new norm so that whenever a political transition took place, the incoming regime either replaced the entire existing Supreme Court or impeached most of its members.

- In 1990 when the first transition between democratically elected governments occurred, Menem complained that the existing Supreme Court, which had be appointed after the transition to democracy in 1983 by the Radical President Alfonsín, would not support him. He then proposed an expansion of the Court from 5 to 9 members which was duly passed and allowed him to name 4 new judges.

De Facto Power in Action: FDR

- Contrast with Roosevelt.
- During his first presidency, the supreme court began ruling key elements of the New Deal unconstitutional.
- Roosevelt responded by proposing that all judges over the age of 70 should be retired (the ones that opposed him). Though the Democrats had big majorities in both houses and Roosevelt had a huge mandate (like Perón), this was widely regarded as an attack on the independence of the court and he had to back down.
- Same "formal institutions" and thus the same "de jure power". Difference? In "de facto power" or "informal institutions".

Social Conflict in Action

- In 1911 in South Africa the Mines and Works Act extended a 'colour bar' which stopped Africans from taking specific occupations in the mining industry. The colour bar was extended to the whole economy after 1926 (it was repealed in 1984).

- The effect of the colour bar was to reduce the competition that skilled white workers faced and increase the supply of unskilled workers, thus driving down their wage. The net effect was to redistribute income massively from blacks to whites.

- Notice that from an economic point of view this institution was very inefficient impeding as it did the allocation of resources and undermining the incentives of Africans.

Social Conflict in Action (continued)

76   An Economic History of South Africa

Table 4.1. *1904 schedule of skilled trades and occupations reserved for European workers*

amalgamator	engineer	painter
assayer	engine-driver	patternmaker
banksman	fireman-overseer	pipeman
blacksmith	fitter	plasterer
boiler-maker	ganger	plate-layer
brass-finisher	ironmoulder	plumber
brassmoulder	joiner	pumpman
bricklayer	machine rockdriller	quarryman-overseer
brickmaker	machine sawyer	rigger
carpenter	machinist	sampler
clerk	mason	signaller
coppersmith	mechanic	skipman
cyanide shiftsman	miller	stonecutter
drill sharpener	millwright	timberman
driver of air	mine carpenter	timekeeper
or steam winch	mine overseer	tinsmith
driver of mechanical	mine storeman	turner
or electrical machinery	onsetter	wiresplicer
electrician	overseer[a]	woodworking machinist

[a] In any capacity other than the management and control of labourers.

Social Conflict in Action (continued)

Table 3.3. *Nominal and real earnings per shift worked of African workers on the gold mines, 1911–61*

	(1) Earnings (including food)	(2) Retail price index	(3) Index of real earnings
	(cents)	(1911=100)	
1911	24	100	100
1916	24	116	86
1921	28	168	69
1926	26	136	80
1931	25	128	82
1936	26	120	90
1941	28	138	85
1946	37	171	90 .
1951	45	218	86
1956	56	263	89
1961	62	293	88

Source: (1) Wilson, *Labour*, p. 66; (2) *Union statistics*, H-23; (3) = (1) ÷ (2) converted to index with 1911=100.

Social Conflict in Action (continued)

South Africa in international perspective   11

Figure 1.3. Per capita personal income, white and African, selected years, 1917–94

Note: Figure above bars is ratio of white to African per capita personal income.

Sources of Inefficiencies

- Why will some economic economic agents support or opt for inefficient arrangements?

1. *Hold-up*
2. *Political Losers*
3. *Economic Losers*

Towards a Theory of Institutions

- Economic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape incentives.
- Economic institutions not only determine the aggregate economic growth potential of the economy, but also the distribution of resources.
- Summarizing these ideas schematically as (where the subscript t refers to current period and $t + 1$ to the future):

$$\text{economic institutions}_t \implies \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{economic performance}_t \\ \text{distribution of resources}_{t+1} \end{array} \right. .$$

Economic Institutions are Collective Choices

- Economic institutions are determined as collective choices of the society, in large part for their economic consequences.
- However, there is typically be a *conflict of interest* among various groups and individuals over the choice of economic institutions.
- Whose preferences will prevail? The answer depends on the distribution of *political power*. Although the efficiency of one set of economic institutions compared with another may play a role in this choice, political power will be the ultimate arbiter. Whoever has more political power is likely to secure the set of economic institutions that they prefer:

$$\text{political power}_t \implies \text{economic institutions}_t$$

Determinants of Political Power

- De jure political power originates from the *political institutions* in society. Political institutions, similarly to economic institutions, determine the constraints on and the incentives of the key actors, but this time in the political sphere.

- Examples of political institutions include the form of government, for example, democracy vs. dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites. Thus

$$\text{political institutions}_t \implies \text{de jure political power}_t$$

- De facto power depends on the ability of the group in question to solve its collective action problem, i.e., to ensure that people act together, even when any individual may have an incentive to free ride. It also depends on a group's on its economic resources:

$$\text{distribution of resources}_t \implies \text{de facto political power}_t$$

Political Institutions

- Societies transition from dictatorship to democracy, and change their constitutions to modify the constraints on power holders.
- Since, like economic institutions, political institutions are collective choices, the distribution of political power in society is the key determinant of their evolution.
- Summarizing this discussion, we have:

$$\text{political power}_t \implies \text{political institutions}_{t+1}$$

Towards A Dynamic Framework

- Putting this together leads to a "dynamical framework" (attention to "state variables" and "stochastic shocks"):

$$
\left.
\begin{array}{c}
\text{political} \\
\text{inst's}_t \quad \implies \\
\\
\text{dist. of} \\
\text{resources}_t \quad \implies
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{de jure} \\
\text{political} \\
\text{power}_t \\
\& \\
\text{de facto} \\
\text{political} \\
\text{power}_t
\end{array}
\right\}
\begin{array}{c}
\implies \quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{econ.} \\
\text{inst's}_t
\end{array} \\
\\
\implies \quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{pol.} \\
\text{inst's}_{t+1}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\implies
\left\{
\begin{array}{c}
\text{econ.} \\
\text{perf}_t \\
\& \\
\text{dist. of} \\
\text{resources}_{t+1}
\end{array}
\right.
$$

- Many models presented later in the course providing building blocks for a coherent framework of this sort.

Do Policies and Institutions Matter?

- At some level, of course.
- But providing conclusive (even suggestive) evidence is not always easy, and the interpretation is far from straightforward.
- Three important points:
  1. There is strong correlation between various measures of policies, economic institutions and political institutions on the one hand and a battery of economic and social variables on the other.
  2. There is suggestive evidence that a significant part of this correlation is due to the "causal" effect of these institutions and policies.
     - Particularly, new work using within country microdata.
  3. The theoretical interpretation of these results needs to be developed further.
     - Key question: why are certain types of institutions and policies chosen (closely related to the econometric endogeneity of institutions).

Aggregate Correlations

Figure 1

From Correlations to "Causality"

- One attempt, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (or earlier work by Hall and Jones, 1999, using geography as instrument).
- But we need a "Theory"
- After the discovery of the New World and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope, Europeans dominated many previously diverse societies, and fundamentally affected their institutions.
- Huge amount of variation in the institutions. Idea: use this variation to test whether or not economic institutions have a causal effect on income per-capita.

Institutional Variation

- "Beginning of Theory": those with political power more likely to opt for good institutions when they will benefit from property rights and investment opportunities.
- Better institutions more likely when there are constraints on elites.
- The colonial context: Europeans more likely to benefit from good institutions when they are a significant fraction of the population, i.e., when they settle
- Lower strata of Europeans place constraints on elites when there are significant settlements.
- Thus: European settlements $\Rightarrow$ better institutions
- But Europeans settlements are endogenous. They may be more likely to settle if a society has greater resources or more potential for growth.
- Or less settlements when greater resources; East India Company and Spanish Crown limited settlements.

Exogenous Source of Variation

- Look for exogenous variation in European settlements: the disease environment
- In some colonies, Europeans faced very high death rates because of diseases for which they had no immunity, in particular malaria and yellow fever.
- Potential mortality of European settlers $\Rightarrow$ settlements $\Rightarrow$ institutions

"Theory"

- Overall summary:

1. There were different types of colonization policies which created different sets of institutions. At one extreme, European powers set up "extractive states". At the other extreme, many Europeans went and settled in a number of colonies, and tried to replicate European institutions, with great emphasis on private property, and checks against government power.

2. The colonization strategy was influenced by the feasibility of settlements. In places where the disease environment was not favorable to European settlement, the formation of the extractive state was more likely.

3. The colonial state and institutions persisted even after independence.

From Correlations to "Causality" (continued)

- Schematically:

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \text{(potential) settler} \\ \text{mortality} \end{array} \Rightarrow \text{settlements} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{early} \\ \text{institutions} \end{array}$$

$$\Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{current} \\ \text{institutions} \end{array} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{current} \\ \text{performance} \end{array}$$

- Try to use this theory to generate a strategy for a two-stage least squares analysis.

- Use "estimates" of potential settler mortality as instrument for institutions in the regression of current GDP (as cumulative measure of growth) on institutions.

- Important: here institutions have to be "very broadly construed".

First Stage

Settler mortality and current institutions

First Stage (continued)

First Stage Regressions:
Dependent variable is protection against risk of expropriation

	All former colonies	All former colonies	All former colonies	Without neo-Europes
Settler Mortality	-0.61	-0.5	-0.43	-0.37
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Latitude		2.34		
		(1.37)		
Continent Dummies (p-value)			[0.25]	
R-Squared	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.11
Number of Observations	63	63	63	59

Standard errors in parentheses
Sample limited to countries for which have GDP per capita data

Reduced Form

Results: Summary

	Second Stage Regressions: Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 1995			
	All former colonies	All former colonies	All former colonies	Without neo-Europes
Protection Against Risk of Expropriation, 1985-95	0.99 (0.17)	1.11 (0.26)	1.19 (0.39)	1.43 (0.45)
Latitude		-1.61 (1.57)		
Continent Dummies (p-value)			[0.09]	
Number of Observations	63	63	63	59

Results: Effect of Colonizer

Table 5
IV Regressions of log GDP per capita with Additional Controls

	Base Sample (1)	Base Sample (2)	British colonies only (3)	British colonies only (4)	Base Sample (5)	Base Sample (6)	Base Sample (7)	Base Sample (8)	Base Sample (9)
Panel A: Two Stage Least Squares									
Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk, 1985-1995	1.10 (0.22)	1.16 (0.34)	1.07 (0.24)	1.00 (0.22)	1.10 (0.19)	1.20 (0.29)	0.92 (0.15)	1.00 (0.25)	1.10 (0.29)
Latitude		-0.75 (1.70)				-1.10 (1.56)		-0.94 (1.50)	-1.70 (1.6)
British Colonial Dummy	-0.78 (0.35)	-0.80 (0.39)							
French Colonial Dummy	-0.12 (0.35)	-0.06 (0.42)							0.02 (0.69)
French legal origin dummy					0.89 (0.32)	0.96 (0.39)			0.51 (0.69)
p-value for Religion Variables							[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.42]
Panel B: First-Stage for Average Protection against Expropriation Risk in 1985-95									
Log European Settler Mortality	-0.53 (0.14)	-0.43 (0.16)	-0.59 (0.19)	-0.51 (0.14)	-0.54 (0.13)	-0.44 (0.14)	-0.58 (0.13)	-0.44 (0.15)	-0.48 (0.18)
Latitude		1.97 (1.40)				2.10 (1.30)		2.50 (1.50)	2.30 (1.60)
British Colonial Dummy	0.63 (0.37)	0.55 (0.37)							
French Colonial Dummy	0.05 (0.43)	-0.12 (0.44)							-0.25 (0.89)
French legal origin					-0.67 (0.33)	-0.7 (0.32)			-0.05 (0.91)
R-Squared	0.31	0.33	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.35	0.32	0.35	0.45
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares									
Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk, 1985-1995	0.53 (0.19)	0.47 (0.07)	0.61 (0.09)	0.47 (0.06)	0.56 (0.06)	0.56 (0.06)	0.53 (0.06)	0.47 (0.06)	0.47 (0.06)

Results: Threats to Validity

TABLE 7—GEOGRAPHY AND HEALTH VARIABLES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Instrumenting only for average protection against expropriation risk						Instrumenting for all right-hand-side variables		
	Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares								
Average protection against expropriation risk, 1985–1995	0.69 (0.25)	0.72 (0.30)	0.63 (0.28)	0.68 (0.34)	0.55 (0.24)	0.56 (0.31)	0.69 (0.26)	0.74 (0.24)	0.68 (0.23)
Latitude		−0.57 (1.04)		−0.53 (0.97)		−0.1 (0.95)			
Malaria in 1994	−0.57 (0.47)	−0.60 (0.47)					−0.62 (0.68)		
Life expectancy			0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)				0.02 (0.02)	
Infant mortality					−0.01 (0.005)	−0.01 (0.006)			−0.01 (0.01)

Within-Country Variation

- Much more promising, provided that within country variation (the local institutions) can be identified.

- Examples:
  - Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
  - Iyer (2004)
  - Besley (1995)
  - Field (2003, 2005)
  - Goldstein and Udry (2005)
  - Dell (2009).

The Effects of Forced Labor

- As we have already seen, in places with dense indigenous populations the Spanish set up labor market institutions to extract rents from them.

- The most famous and largest of these was the *Potosí mita* (mita is a Quechua word which means a 'turn') for the silver mines in Bolivia. But others as well, such as the to the mercury mines in Huancavelica in Peru.

- Melissa Dell examines the long-run effects of the mita on current socio-economic outcomes in Peru.

- Her idea is to look at villages close to the boundary of the mita comparing places just inside to just outside. But these places have to be comparable, so she examines places in Peru where observable characteristics are similar (even going back to the 16th century).

The Effects of Forced Labor (continued)

- Melissa finds that consumption levels inside the mita areas are about 30% below those outside the mita.
- The proximate explanation for this is that although both areas grow the same crops, in non-mita areas people sell produce on the market, in mita areas people are subsistence farmers.
- One reason for this is that there is far less infrastructure in mita areas, fewer roads in worse condition.
- The reason for this seems to be that during the colonial period Haciendas (large landholdings) formed outside the mita areas because the Spanish state did not want them taking labor from the mines. But the owners of these Haciendas were powerful Spanish settlers who were able to lobby for public goods, infrastructure etc. This pattern of relative political power seems to have been very persistent.

Interpreting the Evidence

- Correlation between institutional variations in economic outcomes unlikely to be due to differences in "efficient" institutions across countries.
  - Provided that some of the attempts to obtain "causal" estimates are valid.
- But then what? Social conflict view: much (most?) of the differences in institutions are endogenous.
- But historical accidents as potential sources of variation (but too much of a good thing? Too many of them?).
- Big challenge: to understand the effect of institutions and variation in *endogenous* institutions.
  - The rest of the course: tools to do this and a first attempt.