

14.773 Political Economy of Institutions and Development.

Lectures 7 and 8. Institutional Change, Democratization and Persistence

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Introduction

- Differences between political regimes in terms of distribution of resources and economic performance.
- What determines the equilibrium political regime?
- Why do some societies undergo institutional change?
- More concretely: why did many Western countries become democratic during the 19th century?
- Why did many Latin American countries become democratic but failed to consolidate democracy throughout the 20th century?

Patterns of Political Development

- Britain in the 19th century; democratization and democratic consolidation
- Argentina in the 20th century; democracy-coup cycles
- Singapore; persistent nondemocracy with limited repression
- South Africa until the end of Apartheid; persistent nondemocracy with repression
- What accounts for this diversity?

Unsatisfactory Answers

- One set of answers to these questions are related to “enlightenment”.
 - societies become enlightened and wiser, and that’s when they become democratic
 - this view does not seem to receive widespread support from the data (democracy arises in the midst of intense conflict, not generally a consensual move)
 - it does not explain why democratization took place in some places during sometimes, and why it succeeded in some instances and not in others.
- Another set of answers about “equilibrium institutions” related to behind the veil arguments
 - compare “expected utility” under different regimes
 - not a useful perspective (people are *not* behind a veil of ignorance)
 - does not explain why democratization happens during some episodes

This Lecture

- A baseline framework for analysis of institutional change and emergence of democracy.
- Also use this framework analyze whether democracy will consolidate once it emerges
- Comparative statics about likelihood of democracy versus persistence of nondemocratic regime (possibly under repression).
- I will come back to more credible alternative theories at the end.

Nondemocratic Politics

- Let us start with a simple model of nondemocratic politics.
- This model will provide many of the insights that will be crucial in understanding why democratic regimes emerge.
- Key idea:
 - political power in the hands of an elite
 - but “citizens” excluded from formal, *de jure* power still have a say in politics because of their *de facto* power to undertake collective action, unrest, revolution...
 - → **(no) revolution constraint.**

Preferences

- Suppose that there are two classes, the elite (the rich) with fixed income y^r and the poor citizens with income $y^p < y^r$.
- Total population is normalized to 1, a fraction $1 - \delta > 1/2$ of the agents are poor, with income y^p , and the remaining fraction δ are rich with income y^r .
- Mean income is denoted by \bar{y} .
- Let θ be the share of total income accruing to the rich:

$$y^p = \frac{(1 - \theta)\bar{y}}{1 - \delta} \text{ and } y^r = \frac{\theta\bar{y}}{\delta}. \quad (1)$$

- Also assume

$$\frac{(1 - \theta)\bar{y}}{1 - \delta} < \frac{\theta\bar{y}}{\delta} \text{ or } \theta > \delta,$$

to ensure that $y^p < \bar{y} < y^r$.

Taxation

- Only fiscal instruments, linear tax $\tau \geq 0$ and lump-sum transfer T .
- Taxation is distortionary, with cost of taxation $C(\tau)\bar{y}$ as a function of the tax rate is τ , where C is increasing and strictly convex.
- Then the government budget constraint is therefore

$$T = \tau ((1 - \delta)y^P + \delta y^r) - C(\tau)\bar{y} = (\tau - C(\tau))\bar{y}.$$

- The most preferred tax rate of poor agents is given by

$$\left(\frac{\theta - \delta}{1 - \delta} \right) = C'(\tau^P). \quad (2)$$

- In contrast, the rich elite's political bliss point is $\tau^r = 0$.

Preferences

- Individual utility is defined over the discounted sum of post-tax incomes with discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$, so for individual i at time $t = 0$, it is

$$U^i = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \hat{y}_t^i,$$

where \hat{y}_t^i denotes after-tax income.

- We are in a non-democratic environment, so policy is determined by rich agents.
- The only influence of poor agents is through their de facto power, the threat of revolution.
- The rich will choose policy subject to a revolution constraint.
- Along the equilibrium path where revolution does not take place:

$$U^i = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left((1 - \tau_t) y^i + (\tau_t - C(\tau_t)) \bar{y} \right).$$

Revolution

- If a revolution is attempted, it always succeeds but a fraction μ_t of the productive capacity of the economy is destroyed forever in the process.
- After a revolution, citizens receive all output.
- Therefore, if there is a revolution at time t , each citizen receives a per period return of

$$\frac{(1 - \mu^S)\bar{y}}{(1 - \delta)}.$$

- In all future periods: total income in the economy is $(1 - \mu^S)\bar{y}$ and is shared between $1 - \delta$ agents.
- μ^S is the value of μ_t at the date when the revolution took place
- Suppose that μ_t is equal to $\mu^H = \mu$ with probability q and to $\mu^L = 1$ with probability $1 - q$.

Revolution and Collective Action

- Fluctuations in μ due to ability to solve the collective action problem among the citizens.
- It will be the source of **commitment problems**.
- A change in μ corresponds to a change in the underlying environment, so the elite, who hold political power in nondemocracy, will optimize again.
- As a result, their promise to redistribute today may not materialize due to changes in circumstances tomorrow.

Timing of Events

At each t , the timing of events is as follows:

- μ_t is revealed.
- The elite set the tax rate τ_t^N .
- The citizens decide whether or not to initiate a revolution, denoted by ρ_t with $\rho_t = 1$ corresponding to a revolution at time t . If there is a revolution, they obtain the remaining $1 - \mu_t$ share of output in all future periods.

Equilibrium Concept

- Let us start with the pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria of this game
- Strategies only depend on the current state of the world.
- For the elite the strategy is the tax rate:

$$\tau^N : \{\mu^L, \mu^H\} \rightarrow [0, 1].$$

- For the citizens, it is the revolution decision

$$\rho : \{\mu^L, \mu^H\} \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}.$$

Payoffs after Revolution

- Define $V^P(R, \mu^S)$ as the return to citizens if there is a revolution starting in threat state $\mu^S \in \{\mu, 1\}$.

- Then,

$$V^P(R, \mu^S) = \frac{(1 - \mu^S)\bar{y}}{(1 - \delta)(1 - \beta)}.$$

- Equal sharing of gains from revolution to avoid the free rider problem.
- For the rich elite:

$$V^r(R, \mu^S) = 0.$$

- Since $\mu^L = 1$, the citizens will never attempt a revolution when $\mu_t = \mu^L$.
- Thus, the only relevant value is the one starting in the state $\mu^H = \mu$:

$$V^P(R, \mu^H) = \frac{(1 - \mu)\bar{y}}{(1 - \delta)(1 - \beta)}. \quad (3)$$

Payoffs in Nondemocracy

- Now consider nondemocracy in the state $\mu_t = \mu^L$, where there is no threat of revolution.
- Denote the relevant values by $V^r(N, \mu^L)$ and $V^p(N, \mu^L)$.
- Since there is no threat of revolution in this state, the MPE tax choice for the elite is

$$\tau^N = \tau^r = 0.$$

- Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} V^r(N, \mu^L) &= y^r + \beta \left[qV^r(N, \mu^H) + (1 - q)V^r(N, \mu^L) \right] \\ V^p(N, \mu^L) &= y^p + \beta \left[qV^p(N, \mu^H) + (1 - q)V^p(N, \mu^L) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Values in Nondemocracy (continued)

- What about in state $\mu_t = \mu^H$?
- First, suppose that in this state the elite also set $\tau^N = \tau^r$.
- Then, there is never any redistribution, and the values are

$$V^r(N) = \frac{y^r}{1 - \beta},$$

$$V^p(N) = \frac{y^p}{1 - \beta}$$

regardless of the state.

The Revolution Constraint

- The *revolution constraint* binds if the poor citizens prefer a revolution in the state $\mu_t = \mu^H$ rather than to live in nondemocracy without any redistribution, i.e., if

$$V^P(R, \mu^H) > V^P(N),$$

where $V^P(R, \mu^H)$ is given by (3).

- Using the definitions in (1), the **revolution constraint** is equivalent to

$$\theta > \mu. \tag{4}$$

- In other words, *inequality needs to be sufficiently high*, i.e., θ sufficiently high, for the revolution constraint to bind.
- If inequality is not that high, so that we have $\theta \leq \mu$, there is no threat of revolution even in the state $\mu_t = \mu^H$, even with no redistribution ever.
- In this case, the elite will always set their unconstrained best tax rate, $\tau^N = \tau^r$, and we have no revolution along the equilibrium path.

When the Revolution Constraints Binds

- Suppose that the revolution constraint (4) binds.
- If in this case, the elite set $\tau^N = \tau^r$ in the threat state $\mu_t = \mu^H$, there will be a revolution.
- So the elite need to make some concessions by setting a tax rate $\tau^N = \hat{\tau} > 0$.
- Let us denote the values to the elite and the citizens in the state $\mu_t = \mu^H$ when the elite set a tax rate $\hat{\tau}$ and are expected to do so in the future, and there is no revolution, by $V^r(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau})$ and $V^p(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau})$.
- At this tax rate, we have that an agent of type i has net income of $(1 - \hat{\tau}) y^i$, plus he receives a lump sum transfer of \hat{T} .
- From the government budget constraint, this lump-sum transfer is $\hat{T} = (\hat{\tau} - C(\hat{\tau})) \bar{y}$, where $\hat{\tau} \bar{y}$ is total tax revenue, and $C(\hat{\tau}) \bar{y}$ is the cost of taxation.

When the Revolution Constraints Binds (continued)

- In this case, the value functions are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 V^r(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) = & \\
 & y^r + (\hat{\tau}(\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\hat{\tau})\bar{y}) \\
 & + \beta \left[qV^r(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) + (1 - q)V^r(N, \mu^L) \right],
 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 V^p(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) = & \\
 & y^p + (\hat{\tau}(\bar{y} - y^p) - C(\hat{\tau})\bar{y}) \\
 & + \beta \left[qV^p(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) + (1 - q)V^p(N, \mu^L) \right].
 \end{aligned}$$

- Intuition.

When the Revolution Constraints Binds (continued)

- The best response of the citizens is

$$\rho \begin{cases} = 0 & \text{if } V^P(R, \mu^H) \leq V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) \\ = 1 & \text{if } V^P(R, \mu^H) > V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) \end{cases}$$

- We can also write:

$$\begin{aligned} V^r(N, \mu^H) &= \rho V^r(R, \mu^H) + (1 - \rho) V^r(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) \\ V^P(N, \mu^H) &= \max_{\rho \in \{0,1\}} \rho V^P(R, \mu^H) + (1 - \rho) V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \hat{\tau}) \end{aligned}$$

Preventing Revolution

- The elite would like to prevent revolution if they can.
- Will they be able to do so?
- To determine the answer to this question, we need to see what is the maximum value that the elite can promise to the citizens.
- Clearly this will be when they set the tax most preferred by the citizens, τ^p , given by (2).
- Hence the relevant comparison is between $V^p(R, \mu^H)$ and $V^p(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^p)$.
- If $V^p(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^p) \geq V^p(R, \mu^H)$, then a revolution can be averted, but not otherwise.

Preventing Revolution(continued)

- Solving above equations

$$V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^P) = \frac{y^P + (1 - \beta(1 - q)) (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^P) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y})}{1 - \beta}.$$

- $V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^P)$ crucially depends on q , the probability that the state will be μ^H in the future, since this is the extent to which redistribution will recur in the future (in some sense, how much future redistribution the rich can credibly promise).
- The revolution can be averted if $V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^P) \geq V^P(R, \mu^H)$, or if

$$\frac{y^P + (1 - \beta(1 - q)) (\tau^P(\bar{y} - y^P) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y})}{1 - \beta} \geq \frac{(1 - \mu)\bar{y}}{(1 - \delta)(1 - \beta)},$$

which can be simplified to

$$\mu \geq \theta - (1 - \beta(1 - q)) (\tau^P(\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta)C(\tau^P)). \quad (5)$$

Preventing Revolution(continued)

- If the above condition does not hold, even the maximum credible transfer to a citizen is not enough, and there will be a revolution along the equilibrium path.
- We can now use (5) to define a critical value of μ^H , again denoted μ^* such that $V^P(N, \mu^*, \tau^N = \tau^P) = V^P(R, \mu^*)$, or

$$\mu^* = \theta - (1 - \beta(1 - q)) (\tau^P(\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta)C(\tau^P)). \quad (6)$$

where $\mu^* < \theta$.

- When $\mu \geq \mu^*$, $V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^P) \geq V^P(R, \mu^H)$, and the revolution is averted.
- When $\mu < \mu^*$, $V^P(N, \mu^H, \tau^N = \tau^P) < V^P(R, \mu^H)$, future transfers are expected to be sufficiently rare that even at the best possible tax rate for the citizens, there isn't enough redistribution in the future, and the citizens prefer a revolution rather than to live under nondemocracy with political power in the hands of the elite.

Preventing Revolution(continued)

- Combining these equations, $\hat{\tau}$ is given by:

$$\mu = \theta - (1 - \beta(1 - q)) (\hat{\tau}(\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta)C(\hat{\tau})). \quad (7)$$

This analysis then leads to:

Proposition: There is a unique MPE $\{\tilde{\sigma}^r, \tilde{\sigma}^p\}$ of the game $G^\infty(\beta)$. Let μ^* and $\hat{\tau}$ be given by (6) and (7). Then in this equilibrium:

- If $\theta \leq \mu$, the elite never redistribute and the citizens never undertake a revolution
- If $\theta > \mu$, then we have that:
- If $\mu < \mu^*$, promises by the elite are insufficiently credible to avoid a revolution. In the low state, the elite do not redistribute and there is no revolution, but in the high state a revolution occurs whatever tax rate the elite set.
- If $\mu \geq \mu^*$, the elite do not redistribute in the low state and set the tax rate $\hat{\tau}$ in the high threat state, just sufficient to stop a revolution. The citizens never revolt.

Preventing Revolution(continued)

- For discussion, suppose that $\theta > \mu$.
- Then, starting with the elite in power, if $\mu < \mu^*$, they set a zero tax rate when $\mu_t = \mu^L$, but when the state transits to μ^H , there is a revolution.
- The problem here is that although the elite would like to stay in power by offering the citizens redistribution, they cannot offer today enough to make the present value of nondemocracy to the citizens as great as the present value of revolution.

Comparative Statics

- The threshold μ^* depends θ and on q .
- μ^* is increasing in θ , so that inequality makes revolution more likely (because the revolution constraint is “more binding”)
- μ^* is decreasing in q , because lower q means “less credible commitments to future distribution”—because revolution constraints are rare events.

Incentive Compatible Promises

- MPE limit commitment power.
- What happens if we look at subgame perfect equilibria?
- Issue: “promises” by the elite must be *incentive compatible*, in the sense that when the revolution threats disappears, they should have no incentive to deviate.
- Suppose $\theta > \mu$ and $\mu < \mu^*$, so with the restriction to MPE, the unique equilibrium involves a revolution.
- Compute the maximum value that the elite can promise to the citizens to see whether this will prevent revolution.

Analysis

- First calculate the value to the elite if they redistribute at the rate $\tau^N = \tau^H \leq \tau^P$ in the state $\mu_t = \mu^H$ and at the rate $\tau^N = \tau^L \leq \tau^P$ in the state $\mu_t = \mu^L$
- Since we are no longer looking at Markovian strategies, $\tau^L > 0$ is now possible.

Analysis (continued)

- These values are

$$\begin{aligned}
 V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) = & \\
 & y^r + \left(\tau^L (\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^L) \bar{y} \right) \\
 & + \beta \left[qV^r(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) + (1 - q)V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 V^r(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) = & \\
 & y^r + \left(\tau^H (\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^H) \bar{y} \right) \\
 & + \beta \left[qV^r(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) + (1 - q)V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

Analysis (continued)

- Combining the previous two expressions,

$$V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) = \frac{y^r + (1 - \beta q) (\tau^L (\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^L) \bar{y})}{1 - \beta} + \frac{\beta q (\tau^H (\bar{y} - y^r) - C(\tau^H) \bar{y})}{1 - \beta}$$

as the value that the elite will receive if they stick to their “promised” behavior summarized by the tax vector $[\tau^L, \tau^H]$.

- The key is whether this behavior is “incentive compatible” for them, that is, whether they will wish to deviate from it now or in the future.

Deviation

- What happens if they deviate?
- Clearly, they will deviate when $\mu_t = \mu^L$
- Worst punishment: revolution the first time $\mu_t = \mu^H$.
- Thus, the deviation payoff for the elite is

$$V_d^r(N, \mu^L) = y^r + \beta \left[qV^r(R, \mu^H) + (1 - q) V_d^r(N, \mu^L) \right],$$

- Since $V^r(R, \mu^H) = 0$,

$$V_d^r(N, \mu^L) = \frac{y^r}{1 - \beta(1 - q)}. \quad (8)$$

Incentive Compatibility

- The incentive constraint at the constraint for the elite is

$$V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) \geq V_d^r(N, \mu^L). \quad (9)$$

- The subgame perfect equilibrium that is best for the elite, starting in the state μ^L can be characterized as the solution to

$$\max_{\tau^L, \tau^H} V^r(N, \mu^L, [\tau^L, \tau^H])$$

subject to (9) and

$$V^p(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) \geq V^p(R, \mu^H), \quad (10)$$

where $V^p(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H])$ is the value to the citizens starting in the state μ^H from the tax vector $[\tau^L, \tau^H]$.

- If the constraints set is empty, then in the subgame perfect equilibrium, there will again be revolution.
- Otherwise, revolution can be averted.

Incentive Compatibility (continued)

- Compute the values to the citizens as

$$\begin{aligned}
 V^P(N, \mu^H, [\tau^L, \tau^H]) = & \\
 & \frac{y^P + \beta(1-q)(\tau^L(\bar{y} - y^P) - C(\tau^L)\bar{y})}{1-\beta} \\
 & + \frac{(1-\beta(1-q))(\tau^H(\bar{y} - y^P) - C(\tau^H)\bar{y})}{1-\beta}
 \end{aligned}$$

Incentive Compatibility (continued)

- Clearly, there will exist a minimum value of μ^H such that a revolution can be averted, say μ^{**} .
- This will be given by $\tau^H = \tau^P$ and τ^L the maximum value consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint of the elite, (9), as equality—say $\bar{\tau}'$.
- Solving the incentive compatibility constraint, this is given by

$$\bar{\tau}' (\theta - \delta) + \delta C(\bar{\tau}') = \frac{\beta q}{(1 - \beta q)} \left[\frac{\theta}{1 - \beta(1 - q)} - (\tau^P (\theta - \delta) + \delta C(\tau^P)) \right]. \quad (11)$$

- Important point:* $\bar{\tau}'$ can be significantly less than τ^P because the commitment problem is still present.

Incentive Compatibility (continued)

- Then, the threshold is

$$\mu^{**} = \theta - \beta (1 - q) (\bar{\tau}' (\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta) C(\bar{\tau}')) - (1 - \beta (1 - q)) (\tau^P (\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta) C(\tau^P)), \quad (12)$$

where $\bar{\tau}'$ is given by (11).

- As long as $\bar{\tau}' > 0$,

$$\mu^{**} < \mu^*.$$

- Therefore:

Proposition: When we allow non-Markovian strategies, a revolution can be averted for all $\mu \geq \mu^{**}$. Here $\mu^{**} < \mu^*$, which means that greater redistribution is now possible, but $\mu^{**} > 0$, which means that there are limits how much credible redistribution the elite can promise.

Incentive Compatibility (continued)

- In addition, with SPE, taxes in the high state are not necessarily equal to τ^P , because there is *tax smoothing*
- Because $C(\cdot)$ is convex, it is better to have taxes in the two states closer to each other.
- Full tax smoothing is generally not always incentive compatible, however.

Democratization

- In the model presented so far, the only instrument that the elite have to prevent revolutions is fiscal redistribution within the existing system.
- Alternative: changes in institutions.

Democratization: General Insights

- Why does this make sense?
- Revolution arises because the citizens have *de facto power* today, but have no power in the future.
- Therefore, they are willing to use an inefficient action, revolution, in order to obtain more in the future.
- De facto power is, by its nature, not always persistent.
- But *de jure power*, arising from formal institutions, more persistent.
- If there is a way of transforming the transit tree de facto power of the citizens into more durable de jure power, this might prevent revolution.
- Thus, democratization (more generally institutional change) as a *commitment device*.

Model

- Take the same model as before, augmented with an extension of franchise decision for elites.
- In particular, at the beginning of each date, the elite can change the constitution, and from then on the society is democratic (and this is for now irreversible), and taxes are decided by majoritarian elections.
- Since citizens are in the majority, majoritarian elections will lead to their most preferred tax rate, τ^P , in the future.

Timing of Events

- The state $\mu_t \in \{\mu^L, \mu^H\}$ is revealed.
- The elite decide whether or not to democratize, $\phi \in \{0, 1\}$. If they decide not to democratize, they set the tax rate τ^N .
- The citizens decide whether or not to initiate a revolution, $\rho \in \{0, 1\}$. If $\rho = 1$ they share the remaining income forever. If $\rho = 0$ and $\phi = 1$ the tax rate τ^D is set by the median voter (a poor citizen). If $\rho = 0$ and $\phi = 0$, then the tax rate is τ^N .

Main Result

Proposition:

- If $\theta \leq \mu$, then the revolution constraint does not bind and the elite can stay in power without repressing, redistributing or democratizing.
- If $\theta > \mu$, then the revolution constraint binds. In this case, there exists $\bar{\mu} \in (0, \mu^*)$, where μ^* is defined by (14), such that
 - If $\mu \geq \mu^*$, the elite redistribute income in state μ^H to avoid revolution.
 - If $\mu < \bar{\mu}$, then in state μ^H the elite extends the franchise.
 - If $\bar{\mu} < \mu < \mu^*$, then the unique MPE is in mixed strategies, and involves stochastic franchise extension with some possibility of revolutions along the equilibrium path.
- The last part is a consequence of the fact that when μ is very close to μ^* , the elite could deviate from extending the franchise, and because franchise extension is very beneficial for the poor, the expectation of future extension of franchise may still prevent a revolution.

Intuition

- Democratization is costly: all power is allocated to citizens, and they can set their most preferred tax rate τ^P .
- Fiscal redistribution within the existing system is cheaper, if it is credible.
- Therefore, democratization will only arise when fiscal redistribution within the existing system is not credible.

Modeling Repression

- Income now is

$$\hat{y}^i = \omega (1 - \kappa) y^i + (1 - \omega) ((1 - \tau) y^i + (\tau - C(\tau)) \bar{y}),$$

- κ is the cost due to repression, with $\omega = 0$ denoting no repression and $\omega = 1$ denoting repression. We model the cost of repression as we did the costs of revolution.

Timing of Events

- The state $\mu_t \in \{\mu^L, \mu^H\}$ is revealed.
- The elite decide whether or not to use repression, $\omega \in \{0, 1\}$. If $\omega = 1$, the poor cannot undertake a revolution and the stage game ends.
- If $\omega = 0$, the elite decide whether or not to democratize, $\phi \in \{0, 1\}$. If they decide not to democratize, they set the tax rate τ^N .
- The citizens decide whether or not to initiate a revolution, $\rho \in \{0, 1\}$. If $\rho = 1$ they share the remaining income forever. If $\rho = 0$ and $\phi = 1$ the tax rate τ^D is set by the median voter (a poor citizen). If $\rho = 0$ and $\phi = 0$, then the tax rate is τ^N .

Markovian Equilibria

- Analysis identical to before.
- Democracy is an absorbing state and citizens are in the majority, thus

$$V^P(D) = \frac{y^P + \tau^P(\bar{y} - y^P) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}}{1 - \beta} \text{ and}$$
$$V^R(D) = \frac{y^R + \tau^P(\bar{y} - y^R) - C(\tau^P)\bar{y}}{1 - \beta}.$$

Markovian Equilibria (continued)

- We need to ensure that democracy prevented revolution, that is,

$$V^P(D) \geq V^P(R, \mu^H).$$

- This is equivalent to

$$\mu \geq \theta - (\tau^P(\theta - \delta) - (1 - \delta)C(\tau^P)). \quad (13)$$

- The revolution constraint identical to before.
- Thus the same credibility issues.
- Then, revolution can be prevented by redistribution if $\mu > \mu^* \in (0, 1)$ where

$$V^P(N, \mu^*, \tau^N = \tau^P) = V^P(R, \mu^*). \quad (14)$$

Markovian Equilibria (continued)

- Also, returns from using regression all the time:

$$V^r(O, \mu^H \mid \kappa) = \frac{y^r - (1 - \beta(1 - q))\kappa y^r}{1 - \beta} \text{ and} \quad (15)$$

$$V^p(O, \mu^H \mid \kappa) = \frac{y^p - (1 - \beta(1 - q))\kappa y^p}{1 - \beta}.$$

- When is it beneficial for the lead to use regression versus redistribute or concede democratization?
- The answer will depend on whether κ is greater than the thresholds

$$\kappa^* = \frac{1}{\theta} (\delta C(\hat{\tau}) - \hat{\tau} (\delta - \theta)). \quad (16)$$

$$\bar{\kappa} = \frac{1}{\theta(1 - \beta(1 - q))} (\delta C(\tau^p) - \tau^p (\delta - \theta)). \quad (17)$$

Markovian Equilibria (continued)

Proposition:

- If $\theta \leq \mu$, then the revolution constraint does not bind and the elite can stay in power without repressing, redistributing or democratizing.
- If $\theta > \mu$, then the revolution constraint binds. In addition, let μ^* be defined by (14), and κ^* and $\bar{\kappa}$ be defined by (16) and (17). Then:
 - If $\mu \geq \mu^*$ and $\kappa \geq \kappa^*$, repression is relatively costly and the elite redistribute income in state μ^H to avoid revolution.
 - If $\mu < \bar{\mu}$ and $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$, or $\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}$ and (13) does not hold, or if $\mu \geq \mu^*$ and $\kappa < \kappa^*$, the elite use repression in state μ^H .
 - If $\mu < \bar{\mu}$, (13) holds, and $\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}$, concessions are insufficient to avoid a revolution and repression is relatively costly. In this case, in state μ^H the elite democratize.

Discussion

- Democracy arises if $\mu < \bar{\mu}$, repression is relatively costly, i.e., $\kappa \geq \bar{\kappa}$ and if (13) holds.
- This critical threshold for the cost of repression, $\bar{\kappa}$, is increasing in inequality (increasing in θ), that is,

$$\frac{d\bar{\kappa}}{d\theta} > 0.$$

- Intuitively, when inequality is higher, democracy is more redistributive, i.e., τ^P is higher, and hence more costly to the rich elite. They are therefore more willing to use repression.
- Democracy therefore emerges as an equilibrium outcome only in societies with intermediate levels of inequality.
 - Too high inequality makes democracy too costly for the elite, too low inequality makes nondemocracy sufficiently attractive for the citizens that the revolution threat does not materialize.

Discussion

- *Key ideas:*
 - Conflict and threat of revolution
 - Commitment
 - From de facto to de jure power
- Are these reasonable?

Conflict

- Most instances of democratization amidst conflict and threat of revolution
- Though exceptions exist, most instances of democratization in 19th century Europe and 20th century Latin America in the midst of social unrest
 - democratization “partly taken” not just “given”

Commitment

- Commitment issues central to political economy as usual.
- Commitment to future redistribution in an existing system not truly difficult to maintain.

De Jure Power versus De Facto Power?

- Why is transition to democracy credible?
- Two aspects to this question:
 - what does a constitution or a formal institution mean?
 - why is the transition to democracy not reversed?
- Also, is the de jure power of the citizens in democracy sufficient?
- May or may not be
- To be discussed in the next lectures...

Other Theories

- Another line in the literature views the origins of democratizations still in political economy but in political economic conflict *within* the elite.
- An interesting example of this is the paper by Lizzeri and Persico (2004), which suggests that the broader franchise can sometimes reduce clientelism which is costly for the elite. (We will go over some elements of this model in the next lecture).
- A related idea is proposed by Llavador and Oxoby (2005).
- Yet another line in the literature, for example Galor and Moav (2008), suggest that the elite may have found extension of the franchise beneficial as part of its profit-maximizing investment in human capital.

Econometric Evidence

- Is there a relationship between social unrest/threat of revolution and democratization?
- A number of papers have investigated this issue.
- One example is Aidt and Jensen (2012), focusing in franchise extensions in Europe.
- They estimate in equation of the form:

$$\text{suffrage}_{it} = \alpha \text{suffrage}_{it-1} + \beta \text{revolutionary threat}_{it} + \delta_i + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Here, suffrage_{it} is the fraction of the adult population that can vote.
- They also look at logit models for major democratization events

Econometric Evidence (continued)

- But the competing theories raise the possibility that suffrage extensions are endogenous and potentially correlated with revolutionary threat.
- Aidt and Jensen (2012) propose a “social learning” instrument whereby events in neighboring countries cost changes in suffrage.
- In particular, they construct a distance weighted instrument of neighbors’ democracy/suffrage.
- Is this attractive? What are the problems that can arise?

Evidence

Dependent variable: *Suffrage*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TR ^u (unweighted, major events)	1.89***				2.02***		1.87***	
	[5.78]				[4.24]		[2.68]	
TR ^g (geographical, major events)		1.22***				1.38***		1.20***
		[6.56]				[4.92]		[3.02]
TR ^l (linguistic, major events)			12.00**					
			[1.96]					
TR ^g (geographical, all events)				0.82***				
				[4.80]				
Suffrage (lagged)	0.93***	0.93***	0.92***	0.93***	0.88***	0.88***	0.95***	0.94***
	[69.94]	[73.89]	[66.78]	[70.83]	[35.53]	[35.57]	[51.54]	[51.00]
Log GDP per capita (lagged)	-0.64	-1.66	-0.38	-0.81	3.75	3.31	-1.43	-1.58
	[-0.25]	[-0.72]	[-0.16]	[-0.32]	[0.98]	[0.87]	[-0.35]	[-0.41]
Log Population (lagged)	4.79*	5.11**	5.66**	4.42*	-0.35	-0.36	2.67	2.14
	[1.95]	[2.08]	[2.26]	[1.80]	[-0.56]	[-0.58]	[0.40]	[0.38]
Urbanization rate (lagged)	0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	-0.003	-0.002
	[0.20]	[-0.50]	[0.26]	[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.20]	[-0.22]	[-0.13]
War	4.20***	3.62***	3.50***	4.14***	3.83**	3.83**	3.54**	3.50**
	[3.97]	[3.55]	[3.43]	[3.92]	[2.44]	[2.44]	[2.26]	[2.38]

(continued on next slide)

Evidence (continued)

Dependent variable: *Suffrage*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
WWI	-2.21	-2.26	-2.44	-2.10	-2.66	-2.60	-2.10	-2.03
	[-1.15]	[-1.10]	[-1.17]	[-1.11]	[-0.96]	[-0.94]	[-0.51]	[-0.52]
Educational attainment (lagged)	0.069	-0.099	-0.29	0.12	2.00	2.05	-0.22	-0.34
	[0.09]	[-0.14]	[-0.40]	[0.15]	[1.22]	[1.26]	[-0.15]	[-0.24]
Gold standard	-0.49	-0.19	0.40	-0.56	-0.48	-0.44	-0.04	-0.004
	[-0.60]	[-0.23]	[0.51]	[-0.68]	[-0.36]	[-0.33]	[-0.03]	[-0.003]
Social learning (geographic)	-76.7	-105.5		-64.7	-122.0	-129.8*	-73.8	-51.6
	[-1.07]	[-1.53]		[-0.92]	[-1.58]	[-1.69]	[-0.52]	[-0.39]
Social learning (linguistic)			-2.65*					
			[-1.77]					
Observations	1069	1069	1069	1069	1069	1069	1069	1069
Number of countries	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Estimation technique	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	GMM-System	GMM-System	Bruno LSDV bias corrected estimator	Bruno LSDV bias corrected estimator

Evidence (continued)

Table 3: Results for the Panel Model II.
Dependent variable: *Suffrage*.

	(1) ^b	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TR ^g (geographical, major events)	0.99***	1.97***	1.33***		1.27***	1.23***
	[5.33]	[4.65]	[6.43]		[5.03]	[6.65]
TR ^g (geographical, major events, lagged)				0.99**		
				[2.38]		
Trend	-1.13					
	[-0.45]					
Cycle	2.89					
	[0.42]					
Repression		-0.049				
		[-1.14]				
Temporary transfers			-0.016			
			[-0.35]			
Observations	1057	618	875	1069	1069	1069
Number of countries	12	9 ^a	9 ^a	12	12	12
Estimation technique	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	Fixed Effects	Tobit	Clustering

Evidence (continued)

Estimates of the probability of a suffrage reform, 1820-1938, Western European Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TR ³ (unweighted, major events)	0.74***				
	[3.94]				
TR ⁵ (geographical, major events)		0.51***			0.48***
		[4.21]			[5.23]
TR ¹ (linguistic, major events)			7.17**		
			[2.46]		
TR ⁵ (geographical, all events)				0.45***	
				[3.70]	
Log GDP per capita (lagged)	0.21	-0.09	2.42	-0.16	-0.23
	[0.11]	[-0.046]	[1.28]	[-0.08]	[-0.11]
Log Population (lagged)	0.94***	1.00***	0.85***	0.88***	0.92***
	[3.14]	[3.28]	[2.85]	[3.06]	[2.92]
Urbanization rate (lagged)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.006	-0.003	-0.003
	[-0.77]	[-0.85]	[-1.46]	[-0.71]	[-0.59]
War	-0.13	-0.28	0.06	-0.05	-0.20
	[-0.14]	[-0.27]	[0.064]	[-0.048]	[-0.18]
WW1	-0.92	-0.59	-0.45	-0.37	-0.42
	[-0.82]	[-0.52]	[-0.39]	[-0.32]	[-0.34]
Educational attainment (lagged)	0.34	0.47	0.50	0.48	0.43
	[0.48]	[0.65]	[0.72]	[0.68]	[0.60]
Gold standard	-0.68	-0.49	-0.60	-0.41	-0.45
	[-1.14]	[-0.80]	[-1.01]	[-0.67]	[-0.68]
Social learning (geography)	39.3	42.7		38.9	41.6
	[1.26]	[1.37]		[1.26]	[1.25]
Social learning (linguistic)			-0.32		
			[-0.36]		
Observations	647	647	647	647	647
Number of countries	10	10	10	10	10
Estimation technique	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Rare events

Conclusion

- We have now seen several complementary approaches to institutional change.
- The ones emphasized in this lecture center on the “no revolution constraint” and link institutional changes to conflict in particular to threats of violence, unrest and revolution.
- Some evidence consistent with this, but much remains to be done.

Democracy and Inequality

- The baseline model of democratization we have seen suggests that once democracy emerges (and particularly after it consolidates), it should lead to more redistributive economic institutions.
- But does democracy really lead to greater redistribution and lower inequality?
- The answers in the literature are mixed.
- Recent paper: Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo and Robinson (2013):
 - Democracies lead to higher taxes and government revenues.
 - But their effects on inequality seems much smaller or nonexistent.
- What's going on?

Why Inequality Might Persist

- There are some obvious reasons why inequality may not decline after a transition to democracy.
 - 1 Democratization can cause “Inequality-Increasing Market Opportunities”. In particular, many nondemocracies exclude a large fraction of the population from productive occupations and entrepreneurship (e.g., blacks being excluded from skilled occupations, managerial positions and businesses in apartheid South Africa). Democracy may lift these restrictions, but this will then increase inequality within the excluded group.
 - 2 Stigler’s “Director’s Law,” which says that democracy is always controlled by the middle class. Then democracy will redistribute to as the middle class, which may or may not reduce inequality.
 - 3 “Institutional persistence”.
 - 4 Clientelism: the distribution of state benefits targeted to individuals or groups in exchange for political support.

Problem of Institutional Persistence

- But there is another set of possible explanations.
- Perhaps some — potentially dysfunctional — dimensions of institutions persist after major shocks.
- Prime example: persistence of repression of blacks and low-wage, low education black labor in the US South after emancipation and enfranchisement of blacks at the end of the Civil War.
- Another example: End of colonial system, persistence of economic relations in Latin America
- In both cases, a specific type of persistence: a repressive, or elite-controlled regime is followed by a more democratic-looking regime, but democracy appears to be dysfunctional, not performing, or degenerating into chaos.
 - Some instances of this make some commentators conclude that the society did not have “a culture of democracy”; is that the right way to think about things?.
- More generally: Robert Michels's *Iron Law of Oligarchy*.

Why Persistence?

- Why do institutions persist?
- Related to persistence of power.
- Multifaceted, here focus on persistence of elites
- Also related to: will democracy cater to the needs of the citizens?
 - in many instances, not clear.

Model of De Facto Power: Environment

- Here consider a model based on the Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).
- Mass 1 of citizens and M traditional landed elites, each owning L/M units of land.
 - Below results with finite number of citizens.
- All factors of production supplied inelastically.
- All agents infinitely-lived indiscreet time with discount factor β .
- Two economic institutions: competitive markets, rent per unit of land R^c and labor oppression, rent per unit of land $R^r > R^c$.

Model: Political Power

- Traditional elites can invest in de facto power and will do so since there is a finite number of them.
- Elite i invests $\theta_t^i \geq 0$ in the group's de facto power:

$$P_t^E = \phi \sum_{i \in \mathcal{E}} \theta_t^i. \quad (18)$$

- Political power of the citizens (from sheer numbers and political institutions):

$$P_t^C = \omega_t + \eta I(s_t = D), \quad (19)$$

where $I(s_t = D)$ is an indicator function for $s_t = D$, i.e., for democracy.

- ω_t is a random variable drawn independently and identically over time from a given distribution $F(\cdot)$.
- When $P_t^E \geq P_t^C$, we have $\pi_t = 0$ and the elite have more political power and will make the key decisions; economic institutions today, τ_t , and political regime tomorrow, $s_{t+1} = D$ or $s_{t+1} = N$.

Model: Timing of Events

- At each date t , society starts with a state variable $s_t \in \{D, N\}$. Given this, the following sequence of events take place:
 - 1 Each elite i simultaneously chooses how much to spend to acquire de facto political power for their group, $\theta_t^i \geq 0$, and P_t^E is determined according to (18).
 - 2 The random variable ω_t is drawn from the distribution F , and P_t^C is determined according to (19).
 - 3 If $P_t^E \geq P_t^C$ (i.e., $\pi_t = 0$), a representative elite agent chooses (τ_t, s_{t+1}) , and if $P_t^E < P_t^C$ (i.e., $\pi_t = 1$), a representative citizen chooses (τ_t, s_{t+1}) .
 - 4 Given τ_t , transactions in the land and labor market take place, R_t and w_t are paid to elites and workers respectively, and consumption takes place.
 - 5 The following date, $t + 1$, starts with state s_{t+1} .

Model: Equilibrium Concept

- Let us focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), so that no punishment strategies within the elite.
- Also let's start with symmetric MPE.
- Later look at non-symmetric MPE and subgame perfect equilibria.

Model: Value Functions

- Consider nondemocracy and suppose that all other elite agents, except i , have chosen $\theta(N)$ and agent i chooses θ^i .
- Then, the elite will have political power with probability

$$p(\theta^i, \theta(N) | N) = F(\phi((M-1)\theta(N) + \theta^i)). \quad (20)$$

- The net present discounted value of agent i is

$$V(N) = \max_{\theta^i \geq 0} \left\{ -\theta^i + p(\theta^i, \theta(N) | N) \left(\frac{R^r L}{M} + \beta V(N) \right) + \left(1 - p(\theta^i, \theta(N) | N) \right) \left(\frac{R^c L}{M} + \beta V(D) \right) \right\}, \quad (21)$$

Model: Value Functions (continued)

- Similarly in democracy,

$$p(\theta^i, \theta(D) | D) = F\left(\phi\left((M-1)\theta(D) + \theta^i\right) - \eta\right), \quad (22)$$

$$V(D) = \max_{\theta^i \geq 0} \left\{ -\theta^i + p(\theta^i, \theta(D) | D) \left(\frac{R^r L}{M} + \beta V(N) \right) + \left(1 - p(\theta^i, \theta(D) | D) \right) \left(\frac{R^c L}{M} + \beta V(D) \right) \right\} \quad (23)$$

Equilibrium Conditions

- Suppose we have an interior equilibrium.
- Then the first-order conditions of the above value functions are

$$\phi f(\phi M \theta(N)) \left(\frac{\Delta RL}{M} + \beta V(N) - \beta V(D) \right) = 1, \quad (24)$$

$$\phi f(\phi M \theta(D) - \eta) \left(\frac{\Delta RL}{M} + \beta V(N) - \beta V(D) \right) = 1. \quad (25)$$

- These two equations imply:

$$\theta(D) = \theta(N) + \frac{\eta}{\phi M}. \quad (26)$$

and

$$p(D) \equiv p(\theta(D), \theta(D) | D) = p(\theta(N), \theta(N) | N) \equiv p(N), \quad (27)$$

Assumptions

- Let us assume the following regularity and boundary conditions (for a unique and interior equilibrium):

Assumption F is defined over $(\underline{\omega}, \infty)$ for some $\underline{\omega} < 0$, is everywhere strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable (so that its density f and the derivative of the density, f' , exist everywhere). Moreover, $f(\omega)$ is single peaked (in the sense that there exists ω^* such that $f'(\omega) > 0$ for all $\omega < \omega^*$ and $f'(\omega) < 0$ for all $\omega > \omega^*$) and satisfies $\lim_{\omega \rightarrow \infty} f(\omega) = 0$.

- and

Assumption

$$\min \left\{ \phi f(0) \frac{\Delta RL}{M}, \phi f(-\eta) \frac{\Delta RL}{M} \right\} > 1.$$

Model: Main Result

- Main result is:

Proposition (Invariance): There exists a unique symmetric MPE. This equilibrium involves $p(D) = p(N) \in (0, 1)$, so that the probability distribution over economic institutions is non-degenerate and independent of whether the society is democratic or nondemocratic.

- Therefore, even if de jure power changes, overall power does not change.
- The equilibrium distribution of economic institutions invariant to political institutions— invariance.
- Intuition:
 - technology of de facto power the same for the elite in democracy and nondemocracy;
 - marginal cost of contribution must equal the marginal benefit for each agent, which equalizes probabilities of different economic institutions in the two regimes.

Model: Main Result—Extension

- Does it matter that there is a continuum of citizens?
- Suppose that there are $K < \infty$ citizens and $M < \infty$ elites.
Proposition (Extended Invariance): Supposed that there are $K < \infty$ citizens and $M \ll K$ elites. Then there exists a unique symmetric MPE that is identical to that in the above proposition.
- Intuition: first-order conditions for investing in lobbying can only hold for one of the two groups, and they will do so for the group that has “fewer” members.

Basic Model: Comparative Statics

Proposition: The following comparative static results hold:

① *Economic rents:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \Delta R} > 0.$$

② *Discount factor:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial \beta} > 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial \beta} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \beta} > 0.$$

③ *Number (cohesion) of the elite:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial M} < 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial M} < 0, \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial M} < 0.$$

④ *Democratic advantage of the citizens:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial \eta} > 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial \eta} > 0, \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*}{\partial \eta} > 0.$$

⑤ *Technology of de facto power:*

Democracy As an Absorbing State

- Let us relax the above boundary conditions. Then we have

Corollary: Suppose there exists $\bar{\theta}(N) > 0$ such that

$$\phi f(\phi M \bar{\theta}(N)) \left(\frac{\Delta RL/M - \beta \bar{\theta}(N)}{1 - \beta F(\phi M \bar{\theta}(N))} \right) = 1, \quad (28)$$

and that

$$\eta > -\underline{\omega} \quad (29)$$

Then in the baseline model, there exists a symmetric MPE in which $p(N) \in (0, 1)$ and $p(D) = 0$.

- Therefore, an equilibrium with permanent democracy. But, the equilibrium characterized above might still exist.
- Finally, note that the above boundary condition can be relaxed to:

Assumption A There exists $\bar{\theta}(N) > 0$ satisfying (28), and

$$\phi f(-\eta) \left(\frac{\Delta RL/M - \beta \bar{\theta}(N)}{1 - \beta F(\phi M \bar{\theta}(N))} \right) > 1.$$

Model: Non-Symmetric MPE and SPE

- Same results without symmetry:

Proposition (Non-Symmetric MPE and Invariance): Any MPE involves $p(D) = p(N) \in (0, 1)$.

- Define Pareto optimal SPE as those in which no elite can be made better off without some other elite agent be made worse off.

Proposition (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Invariance):

There exists $\bar{\beta} \in [0, 1)$ such that for all $\beta \geq \bar{\beta} \in [0, 1)$, the symmetric Pareto optimal SPE induces equilibrium probabilities of labor repressive institutions $p(D) = p(N) \in (0, 1)$. Moreover, as $\beta \rightarrow 1$, any Pareto optimal SPE involves $p(D) = p(N) \in (0, 1)$.

Markov Regime-Switching Model of State Dependence

- Above model: invariance, but democracy as likely to follow democracy as to follow nondemocracy.
- Let us now generalize the above model to get a richer form of persistence.
- In particular, so far probability of different economic institutions and different future political institutions independent of current political institutions.
- Two alternative models:
 - Limits on the de facto political power of the elite
 - Sluggish economic institutions

Limits on the De Facto Political Power of the Elite

- Suppose that there are limits on the de facto political power of the elite in democracy. In particular ϕ replaced by $\phi_D \in (0, \phi)$ in democracy.

- Then:

Proposition(Limits on De Facto Power): Any symmetric MPE of the modified model with limits on the elite's de facto power in democracy leads to a Markov regime switching structure where the society fluctuates between democracy with associated competitive economic institutions ($\tau = 1$) and nondemocracy with associated labor repressive economic institutions ($\tau = 0$), with switching probabilities $p(N) \in (0, 1)$ and $1 - p(D) \in (0, 1)$ where $p(D) < p(N)$.

Limits on the De Facto Political Power of the Elite: Comparative Statics

- Now we have:

Proposition: The following comparative static results hold:

- Economic rents:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0, \frac{\partial p^*(N)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*(D)}{\partial \Delta R} > 0.$$

- Discount factor:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial \beta} > 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial \beta} > 0, \frac{\partial p^*(N)}{\partial \beta} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*(D)}{\partial \beta} > 0.$$

- Number (cohesion) of elites:*

$$\frac{\partial \theta^*(N)}{\partial M} < 0, \frac{\partial \theta^*(D)}{\partial M} < 0, \frac{\partial p^*(N)}{\partial M} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial p^*(D)}{\partial M} < 0.$$

- Weaker than before, because the regularity conditions are now stronger, and also comparative statics with respect to ϕ and η ambiguous.

Sluggish Economic Institutions

- Suppose that it is costly for the elite to immediately change economic institutions.
- They receive rent equal to look $R^p < R^r$ when they take control.
- Define

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{R^p - R^c}{\Delta R},$$

Proposition (Sluggish Economic Institutions): The symmetric MPE of the model with sluggish economic institutions leads to a Markov regime switching structure where the society fluctuates between democracy with associated competitive economic institutions ($\tau = 1$) and nondemocracy with associated labor repressive economic institutions ($\tau = 0$), with switching probabilities $p(N) \in (0, 1)$ and $1 - p(D) \in (0, 1)$ where $p(D) < p(N)$.

- Similar comparative static results.
- But also, lower λ increases $p(N)$ because democracy more costly.

But History Is Not Destiny

- The view that crude or qualified determinism widespread and social sciences.
- Determinism very different from persistence.
- Above examples show that change is ubiquitous, even though there are clear mechanisms of persistence at work.
- Some of this change is toward equilibria that lead to better economic performance.

Ending Persistence: Effective Reform

- The model suggests that very significant or simultaneous reforms necessary to end dysfunctional persistence.
- Examples:
 - Reform in formal institutions, switching from nondemocracy to democracy, but at the same time limiting the exercise of de facto political power by the elite.
 - Simultaneous reform in politics and economic institutions that are irreversible or hard to reverse, so that the economic rents the elite will gain by reversing the reforms are lower.
- Example of successful radical reform: Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England; simultaneous change in the distribution of de jure and de facto political power.

Emergence of Constitutional Monarchy in England

- 17th Century saw a struggle between Parliament and the Stuart Kings, with the Civil War 1642-1651 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when after a brief struggle Parliament ejected James II and made William of Orange King.
- Political Reforms: Regular Parliaments for the first time, Parliament given power over fiscal policy.
- Economic Reforms: removal of ability of Crown to predate on society, abolition of Crown granted monopolies, creation of Bank of England.
- Development of state institutions of taxation (the fiscal-military state).

End of Southern Equilibrium

- Starting in the 1940s rapid convergence of the Southern economy to US average takes place.
- End of isolation of the labor market.
- Abolition of institutionalized racial discrimination in labor markets and social life and re-enfranchisement of blacks culminating in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Summary

- Coherent framework for thinking about coexistence of institutional change and persistence.
- De jure power and constitutions are not everything.
- We need to take de facto political power seriously.
- Interaction of de jure and de facto political power useful in thinking about persistence of institutions in the US South, in Central America, Colombia, Liberia.
- But this theory not sufficient understand persistence of bad rulers in Congo or Ethiopia, or why inequality re-created itself in Bolivia.
- Future work...

Example of Captured Democracy?

- Anderson, François and Kotwal (2011) provides a possible example of captured democracy, rural governance institutions (Gram Panchayats) in Maharashtra India.
- Elections are free, with very limited fraud and coercion, and typically lead to high representation.
- Citizens also appear to believe that the democratic process works.
- However, land-owning elite from the leading caste, Marathas, dominate politics both directly and indirectly, and this often has the effect of undermining redistributive policies and also poverty alleviation programs.

Example of Captured Democracy? (continued)

- Villagers are generally dissatisfied with the performance of rural governance institutions, and there is general recognition that power is in the hands of upper caste members and landowners.
- Empirical work by Anderson et al. shows that Maratha elites dominate politics in places where they are more numerous (in part because of block caste voting and the greater social cohesion) but also in places where they own more land.
- In such elite-dominated villages, wages are lower (even though productivity on agricultural lands and profits are higher).
- Anderson et al. suggest that this pattern reflects patron-client relations in Maharashtra villages, empowering the elite. We next turn to a brief discussion of clan to listen.