Lecture Slides:
Job Loss and Job Search at the Micro and Macro Level

David Autor

14.662 Graduate Labor Economics

Spring 2017

Workers Are Aware of Job Loss and Job Finding Risk

Figure 8. Perceived Availability of Good Jobs, March 2002 to June 2011[a]

Data from Gallup polls

Davis and von Wachter 2011

Workers Are Aware of Job Loss and Job Finding Risk

Figure 7. Perceived Likelihoods of Job Loss and Job Finding versus the Contemporaneous Unemployment Rate, Prime-Age Workers, 1977–2010[a]



Data from CPS and General Social Survey

Davis and von Wachter 2011

Workers Are Aware of Job Loss and Job Finding Risk



Data from CPS and General Social Survey

Davis and von Wachter 2011

Mass Layoff Rates are Higher for Low Tenure Workers

Figure 3. Displacement Rates for Men, by Job Tenure and Age at Displacement, 1980 to 2005[a]



Davis and von Wachter 2011

Mass Layoff Rates are Higher for Younger Workers



Davis and von Wachter 2011

“Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers”

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan

AER, 1993

Worker Earnings Losses Before after Separation in Mass Layoff: Dip, Drop, Recovery



FIGURE 1. QUARTERLY EARNINGS (1987 DOLLARS) OF HIGH-ATTACHMENT WORKERS SEPARATING IN QUARTER 1982:1 AND WORKERS STAYING THROUGH QUARTER 1986:4

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Worker Earnings Losses after Mass Layoff: Impact of Adding Worker-Specific Trends



Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Using Non-Laid Off Workers in Same Mass-Layoff Firm as Comparison Group



Model 4 includes firm × time effects

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Davis and VW '11: Earnings Effects of Mass Layoffs on Separators and Non-Separators

Figure 2. Estimated Effects of Mass-Layoff Events on Earnings



Hall's BPEA discussion of Davis and von Wachter 2011

Earnings Losses *Much Smaller* for Separators in *Non-Mass Layoff* Sample



Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Non-Mass Layoff Sample: Adding Firm-Specific Trends Reduces Impact Even Further



Model 4 includes firm × time effects

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Estimated Worker Wages Losses From Mass Layoff by Initial Employer Size

	Dip	Drop	Recovery	Fifth-year loss dif	Fifth-year loss
Overall	−83.3 (2.2)	−2,179 (16)	15.4 (4.4)	—	−6,611 (150)
Firm size:					
50–500	−16.1 (2.1)	−37 (22)	13.0 (2.9)	501 (124)	−6,110 (193)
501–2,000	13.9 (2.2)	214 (23)	−4.7 (3.1)	625 (135)	−5,986 (246)
2,001–5,000	27.2 (2.3)	480 (24)	−23.8 (3.5)	730 (149)	−5,881 (203)

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Estimated Worker Wages Losses From Mass Layoff by Initial Industry

Group	Number	Dip[c]	Drop[d]	Recovery[e]	Fifth-year loss dif	Fifth-year loss
Industry:						
Mining and construction	247	9.5 (5.8)	−387 (59)	−0.1 (7.8)	−1,549 (339)	−8,160 (369)
Nondurable manufacturing	1,206	18.3 (2.6)	338 (28)	−7.7 (3.7)	967 (160)	−5,644 (224)
Primary metals	1,354	−104.5 (2.7)	−1,476 (30)	40.5 (4.4)	−3,878 (191)	−10,489 (241)
Fabricated metals	436	15.9 (4.2)	488 (45)	−9.8 (6.5)	1,465 (279)	−5,146 (312)
Nonelectrical machinery	632	35 (3.5)	797 (39)	−27.4 (5.9)	1,817 (257)	−4,794 (306)
Electrical machinery	421	49.5 (4.3)	494 (47)	−2.7 (6.4)	1,842 (282)	−4,769 (322)
Transportation equipment	419	14.1 (4.4)	215 (48)	−15.5 (6.6)	85 (282)	−6,526 (324)

Estimated Worker Wages Losses From Mass Layoff by Initial Industry (continued)

Group	Number	Dip[c]	Drop[d]	Recovery[e]	Fifth-year loss dif	Fifth-year loss
Other durable manufacturing	441	18.9 (4.2)	338 (43)	9.1 (5.7)	1,807 (242)	−4,804 (282)
Transportation, communication, and public utilities	348	5.5 (4.8)	66 (50)	−63.6 (7.1)	−2,916 (301)	−9,527 (333)
Wholesale and retail trade	545	20.0 (3.8)	126 (38)	4.8 (4.9)	745 (211)	−5,866 (251)
Finance, insurance, and real estate	183	115.7 (6.7)	947 (72)	24.3 (8.3)	5,004 (358)	−1,608 (387)
Professional, business, and entertainment services	203	93.1 (6.4)	1,270 (64)	−26.2 (8.7)	3,769 (369)	−2,843 (394)

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Separations from Manufacturing *Leading to Moves out of Manufacturing* Appear Costly

TABLE 3—EARNINGS LOSSES BY SECTOR OF NEW JOB: DEVIATION BETWEEN ACTUAL AND EXPECTED QUARTERLY EARNINGS

Quarters since separation	New job in same sector: Same four-digit SIC	New job in same sector: Different four-digit SIC	New job in other sector
A. *Displaced Manufacturing Workers:*			
−8	−$379 (82) [−7]	−$117 (67) [−2]	−$237 (73) [−4]
12	−1,044 (82) [−19]	−1,117 (67) [−21]	−2,616 (73) [−44]
24	−1,103 (197) [−20]	−958 (137) [−18]	−2,221 (150) [−38]

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers in square brackets express the estimated losses as a percentage of predisplacement earnings.

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

Separations from Nonmanufacturing *Leading to Moves into Other Sectors* Appear Not so Costly

TABLE 3—EARNINGS LOSSES BY SECTOR OF NEW JOB: DEVIATION BETWEEN ACTUAL AND EXPECTED QUARTERLY EARNINGS

Quarters since separation	New job in same sector: Same four-digit SIC	New job in same sector: Different four-digit SIC	New job in other sector
B. *Displaced Nonmanufacturing Workers:*			
−8	−229 (132) [−4]	−26 (128) [0]	−151 (231) [−3]
12	−1,129 (132) [−18]	−1,305 (128) [−23]	−1,498 (231) [−26]
24	−1,103 (315) [−18]	−1,276 (241) [−22]	−1,949 (476) [−33]

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers in square brackets express the estimated losses as a percentage of predisplacement earnings.

Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993

“Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using Administrative Data”

Sullivan and von Wachter

QJE, 2009

Sullivan and von Wachter '09
Sample Characteristics: Balance Test

	All workers (4)	Displaced workers (5)	Nondisplaced workers (6)
Sample size	17,641	4,785	12,856
Age in 1979	37.42	37.01	37.57
	(7.031)	(7.295)	(6.925)
Log(average quarterly earnings in 1974–1979)	8.75	8.70	8.76
	(0.345)	(0.338)	(0.346)
Log(std. dev. of log quarterly earnings 1974–1979)	−1.680	−1.545	−1.731
	(0.709)	(0.749)	(0.687)
Percent change in quarterly earnings 1974–1979	0.459	0.582	0.413
	(5.343)	(7.287)	(4.410)
Number of quarters in nonemployment 1974–1979	0.45	0.54	0.42
	(0.919)	(1.029)	(0.873)
1979 firm's employment	8,087	9,065	7,723
	(13,267)	(15,018)	(12,534)
Fraction steel industries	0.163	0.260	0.128
	(0.370)	(0.438)	(0.334)
Fraction other durable goods manufacturing (nonsteel)	0.300	0.365	0.275
	(0.458)	(0.481)	(0.447)
Fraction other manufacturing	0.200	0.183	0.206
	(0.400)	(0.387)	(0.405)
Fraction eastern PA	0.581	0.521	0.603
	(0.493)	(0.500)	(0.489)

Sullivan and von Wachter 2009

Sullivan and von Wachter '09 Outcomes Comparison

	Work every year		
	All workers (4)	Displaced workers (5)	Nondisplaced workers (6)
Log(average quarterly earnings in 1987–1991)	8.728	8.421	8.838
	(0.891)	(1.064)	(0.792)
Log(std. dev. of log quarterly earnings in 1987–1991)	−1.393	−1.197	−1.462
	(0.736)	(0.757)	(0.716)
Number of quarters in nonemployment in 1987–1991	2.20	3.32	1.79
	(4.736)	(5.900)	(4.145)
Deaths per 1,000 per year 1987–2006	6.343	6.913	6.132
	(0.152)	(0.306)	(0.175)
Deaths per 1,000 per year 1987–1993	3.745	4.400	3.502
	(0.189)	(0.393)	(0.214)
Deaths per 1,000 per year 1994–1999	6.994	7.451	6.826
	(0.242)	(0.481)	(0.280)
Deaths per 1,000 per year 2000–2006	10.347	11.033	10.094
	(0.458)	(0.911)	(0.529)

Sullivan and von Wachter 2009

Sullivan and von Wachter '09: Impact of Displacement on Log Mortality Odds by Age



FIGURE II

The Effect of Displacement on Log-Odds of Death by Years since Displacement (Sample of Men in Stable Employment 1974–1979, Firm 1979 Employment ≥50,

Sullivan and von Wachter 2009

Sullivan and von Wachter '09: Impact of Displacement on Log Mortality Odds by Age

TABLE V

IMPACT OF JOB DISPLACEMENT ON LIFE EXPECTANCY BY AGE AT SEPARATION AND JOB TENURE

Sample	Age at separation	Life expectancy given not displaced	Life expectancy given displaced	Lost years of life due to displacement
(1) Stable job 1974–1979; no restrictions on earnings 1980–1986; 1920–1959 birth year; tenure in 1979 at least six years	30	76.45	74.85	−1.59
	35	76.56	74.99	−1.56
	40	76.73	75.22	−1.51
	45	76.99	75.58	−1.41
	50	77.37	76.01	−1.36
	55	77.92	76.64	−1.29
(2) Stable job 1974–1979; no restrictions on earnings 1980–1986; 1920–1959 birth year; tenure in 1979 at least three years	30	76.56	74.97	−1.59
	35	76.67	75.10	−1.57
	40	76.85	75.29	−1.56
	45	77.11	75.58	−1.53
	50	77.49	76.00	−1.50
	55	78.05	76.62	−1.43

Sullivan and von Wachter 2009

“Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss”

Davis and von Wachter

Brookings Paper, 2011

Davis and von Wachter '11: 3rd Year Earnings Losses Greater for Workers Laid Off During Recessions

Figure 5. Earnings Losses of Men in the Third Year of Displacement versus Unemployment Rate in the Displacement Year, 1980–2005[a]



Davis and von Wachter 2011

Davis and von Wachter '11: Cumulative Earnings Losses Greater for Workers Laid Off During Recessions

Figure 6. Cumulative Earnings Losses after Displacement versus Unemployment Rate in the Displacement Year, 1980–2005[a]



Davis and von Wachter 2011

Davis and von Wachter '11: Proportional Earnings Losses Greater for Layoffs during Recessions



Davis and von Wachter 2011

Davis and von Wachter '11: PDV of Earnings Losses

Table 1. Present-Value Earnings Losses after Mass-Layoff Events, Men 50 or Younger with at Least 3 Years Prior Job Tenure, 1980–2005[a]

		PDV of average loss at displacement		
Subgroup[b]	*% of all years from 1980 to 2005*	*Dollars*	*As a multiple of predisplacement annual earnings*	*As % of PDV of counterfactual earnings*[c]
All	100	77,557	1.71	11.9
Displaced in expansion year	88	72,487	1.59	11.0
Displaced in recession year	12	109,567	2.50	18.6
Displaced in year with unemployment rate:				
<5.0%	23	50,953	1.06	9.9
5.0–5.9%	35	71,460	1.56	10.9
6.0–6.9%	13	71,006	1.58	10.7
7.0–7.9%	21	89,792	2.07	14.4
≥ 8.0%	8	121,982	2.82	19.8

Davis and von Wachter 2011

Oreo, vW, Heisz '12: Persistent Earnings Effects of Graduating College in Recession



FIGURE 1A. MATURE AND ENTRY LEVEL EARNINGS AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES BY GRADUATION YEAR

Notes: The figure plots average log annual earnings profiles by year of degree completion for our baseline sample (all males in our administrative data that began a full-time undergraduate program at a post-secondary school institution in Canada between the ages of 17 and 20 from 1976–1995). See text and Data Appendix for more details.

Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012

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Labor Dept: Available Labor Rate Increases To 10.2%



"The Effect of Unemployment Benefits and Nonemployment Durations on Wages"

Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender

AER, 2016

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of German Extended UI on Length of UI Receipt



(a) Months of receiving UI benefits

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of German Extended UI on Months of Non-Employment



(b) Months of Nonemployment

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of German Extended UI on Reemployment Wages



(a) Log post unemployment wage

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of Extended UI on Reemployment Wage: Contrasting Post vs. Pre Extension



(b) Log wage difference (pre unemployment minus post unemployment)

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of Extensions on Unemployment Exit Hazard

Figure 5: Effect of Increasing Potential Unemployment Insurance (UI) Durations from 12 to 18 Months on the Hazard and Survival Functions - Regression Discontinuity Estimate at Age 42 Discontinuity



Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Impact of Extensions on Reemployment Wages

Figure 6: The Effects of Extended Potential UI Durations on Reemployment Wages throughout the Spell of Non-employment



(a) Post-unemployment log wage

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Reduced Form: UI Durations and Employment Outcomes

Table 1: The Effect of Potential UI Durations on Non-employment Duration and the Post Unemployment Wage

	(1) UI Benefit Duration	(2) Non-Emp Duration	(3) Ever emp. again	(4) Log Post Wage	(5) Log Wage Difference	(6) Log Wage Controlling for Observables
Increase in Potential UI Dur. from 12 to 18 Months						
RD Estimate (Age $\geq$ cutoff)	1.77	0.95	-0.0094	-0.0078	-0.0070	-0.0072
	[0.048]**	[0.19]**	[0.0033]**	[0.0036]*	[0.0034]*	[0.0032]*
Marginal Effect $\frac{dy}{dP}$	0.29	0.16	-0.0016	-0.0013	-0.0012	-0.0012
	[0.0080]**	[0.032]**	[0.00046]**	[0.00060]*	[0.00058]*	[0.00057]*
Effect relative to mean	0.23	0.065	-0.011	-0.0019	0.050	-0.0018
Observations	510955	437899	510955	437182	420311	422635
Mean of Dep. Var.	7.57	14.7	0.86	4.01	-0.14	4.01

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Modest Selection on Length of Completed UI Spell

Figure 4: The Effects of Extended Potential UI Durations on Selection throughout the Spell of Non-employment



(a) Pre-unemployment log wage by time of non-emp exit

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14:
Wage Effects Controlling for Unemployment Duration

Table 3: The Effect of Potential UI Durations on Reemployment Wages Conditional on Nonemployment Duration

	(1) $log(w)$	(2) $log(w)$	(3) $P(log(w) > 3.5)$	(4) $P(log(w) > 3.75)$	(5) $P(log(w) > 4)$
Increase in Potential UI Dur. from 12 to 18 Months					
Marginal Effect $\frac{dy}{dP}$	0.000093	-0.000042	0.00027	-0.00021	-0.00030
	[0.00075]	[0.00068]	[0.00049]	[0.00062]	[0.00073]
Observations	437182	437182	437182	437182	437182
Mean of Dep. Var.	4.01	4.01	0.88	0.75	0.56

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

Schmeider, vW, Bender '14: Causal Effects Estimates of UI Extensions on Wages

IV Estimates

	(1) OLS Main Sample	(2) OLS Nonemp Dur $\leq$ 18 months	(3) OLS Nonemp Dur $\leq$ 18 months No Exp. Restr.	(4) 2SLS Main Sample	(5) 2SLS Reemp Wage No Experience Restrictions
Increase in Potential UI Dur. from 12 to 18 Months					
Nonemp. Duration	-0.0067	-0.017	-0.020	-0.0078	-0.013
	[0.000053]**	[0.00018]**	[0.000092]**	[0.0033]*	[0.0026]**
Observations	437182	332063	1392502	437182	1717597
Mean of Dep. Var.	4.01	4.08	3.96	4.01	3.91

Schmeider, von Wachter, and Bender 2014

"Labor Supply Shocks, Native Wages, and the Adjustment of Local Employment"

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler
Quarterly Journal of Economics 2017

The Quasi-Experiment

Our analysis takes advantage of a commuting policy (Grenzgängerregelung), triggered by the fall of the Iron Curtain… that allowed workers from the neighboring Czech Republic to seek employment in German districts along the German-Czech border… These workers were not granted residence, forcing them to commute on a daily basis between their home country and their workplace in Germany. The policy was otherwise nonrestrictive.

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Geography of the Czech Immigration Supply Shock



Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Czech Employment Shares Along the German-Czech Border (vs. Inland Districts)

Figure II: Employment Shares of Czech nationals: Border vs Inland

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Distance to Nearest Border Crossing – A Major Determinant of the Flow of Czech Commuters

Figure III: Spatial Distribution of Czech Commuters in Border Region



Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

First Stage

TABLE III

FIRST STAGE: THE INFLOW OF CZECH COMMUTERS AND DISTANCE TO BORDER

	Border region only	Including matched control districts
Distance (×100)	−0.338	−0.338
	(0.095)	(0.092)
Distance (×100) squared	0.268	0.268
	(0.113)	(0.110)
Constant (border region)	0.115	0.114
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant (inland)		0.0011
		(0.0003)
No. municipalities	291	1,550
R^2	0.387	0.544
F	42.58	52.70

Note. The table reports the coefficients from the first stage regression of the inflow of Czech workers into the municipality, measured as the increase in the number of Czech workers between 1990 and 1992 as a share of local employment in 1990, on airline distance and distance squared to the next border crossing. Regressions are estimated at the municipality level, weighted by local employment in 1990. In the first column, the sample is restricted to the border region. The second column additionally includes matched control districts, and distance and distance squared is interacted with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the municipality is part of the border region. Standard errors are clustered on the district level.

Data Source: German Social Security Records, border region and matched control districts, 1990 and 1992.

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Cumulative Aggregated Wage Effects: 2SLS Estimates



Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Cumulative Aggregate Employment Effects: 2SLS Estimates



Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Baseline Wage and Employment Impact Estimates

WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT BASELINE ESTIMATES BY SKILL, 1990–1993

		Wages	Employment
Panel A: All			
(i)	2SLS	−0.134	−0.926
		(0.047)	(0.251)
(ii)	OLS	−0.058	−0.263
		(0.038)	(0.184)
Panel B: Unskilled			
(i)	2SLS	−0.202	−1.371
		(0.048)	(0.395)
(ii)	OLS	−0.094	−0.789
		(0.041)	(0.215)
Panel C: Skilled			
(i)	2SLS	−0.106	−0.501
		(0.051)	(0.214)
(ii)	OLS	−0.054	0.049
		(0.025)	(0.196)
	No. municipalities	1,550	1,550

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

2SLS Wage and Employment Impacts by 1-Digit Occupation



Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Most of the Employment Effect Occurs Through a Reduction in Native Inflows



FIGURE VII

Yearly Native Inflow and Outflow Effects

The figures plot coefficient estimates from the 2SLS regressions of yearly native inflow rate (i.e., natives employed in area in year t but not in t-1, divided by native employment in t-1) or outflow (employed in year t-1 but not t) rate of natives on the inflow of Czech workers in the municipality between 1990 and 1992. While the first stage regression is weighted by total native employment in the municipality in 1990, the second stage regression is weighted by native employment in the respective base year. The 95% confidence interval is based on bootstrapped standard errors which use 500 replications and allow for clustering on the municipality level. The coefficient estimate for outflows in 1989 and inflows in 1988 represent outliers (see details in the text) and are plotted, but not connected. *Data Source*: German Social Security Records, border region and matched inland control districts, 1986 to 1996.

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

Most of the Employment Effect Occurs Through a Reduction in Native Inflows

		Inflows vs outflows	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total employment	Inflows	Outflows
Panel A: All			
Share of baseline employment		0.18	0.16
	−0.989	−0.878	0.111
	(0.318)	(0.258)	(0.152)
Panel B: By skill			
Unskilled			
Share of baseline employment		0.15	0.17
	−1.256	−1.385	−0.129
	(0.534)	(0.391)	(0.210)
Skilled			
Share of baseline employment		0.19	0.16
	−0.875	−0.761	0.115
	(0.290)	(0.250)	(0.144)

Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2017

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NEWS • 5.3.06 VOL 42 / ISSUE 18

Illegal Immigrants Returning To Mexico For American Jobs

- Tensions between Mexicans and illegally re-entered Mexicans — dubbed repatriados — continues to build.
- "I hate these Mexicans, always coming back here to Mexico from America and taking American jobs from the Mexicans who stayed in Mexico," …
- "Why don't they go back to where they went to?"

What Exactly is a Local Labor Market? Manning and Petrongolo 2016

M&P ’16: Three observations

1. Labor markets are *local* – attractiveness of jobs to applicants sharply decays with distance
2. Labor markets *overlap* – Relevant labor market for differs for worker who lives in Porter vs. Kendall Square, although both live in same CZ.
3. Workers compete when searching – discouraged from searching in areas with strong job competition from other jobseekers

What Exactly is a Local Labor Market? Manning and Petrongolo 2016

M-P '16: Three observations

1. Labor markets are *local*
2. Labor markets *overlap*
3. Workers *compete when searching*

Implications

- Local stimulus or transport improvement will have modest effects on *local* outcomes
  - Ripple effects in job applications dilute their impact across a series of overlapping markets
- Local interventions will 'work better' in remote areas
- *All of which raises the question of why local labor market analyzes (e.g, China Shock style) work at all…*

“Do Labor Market Policies have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment”

Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, Zamora

AER, 2013

Equilibrium Employment and Tightness in the Crépon et al. Model



Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Impacts of Intervention in Slack v. Taught Labor Market



Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Evidence on Worker Take-Up of Job Search Assistance

Dependent variable	(1) All workers	(2) Not employed	(3) Employed
Panel A: Program participation			
Program participation	0.350***	0.434***	0.246***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Panel B: Change in search productivity			
Number of meeting with a counselor	0.551***	0.601***	0.454***
	(0.059)	(0.083)	(0.064)
Control mean	2.497	3.444	1.361
Received help with CV, coaching for interviews, etc.	0.100***	0.113***	0.081***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Control mean	0.213	0.285	0.126
Help with matching (identify job offers, help with transports)	0.009	0.008	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Control mean	0.153	0.199	0.099
Panel C: Employment outcomes			
Long-term fixed contract	0.007	0.017***	–0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Control mean	0.2	0.16	0.247
Long-term employment	0.002	0.015	–0.012
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Control mean	0.468	0.365	0.593
Observations	21,431	11,806	9,625

Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Crépon et al: Impacts of Counseling on Hiring in >6 Months Contract: Treatment v. Control



Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Some Evidence of Crowd-Out Among Control Group Males (Workers Not Employed at Start of Treatment Period)

	Labor market outcome: Long term fixed contract			
		Not employed		
	(1) All workers	(2) All	(3) Men	(4) Women
Assigned to treatment in 25% areas	0.016	0.021	0.037	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.016)
Assigned to treatment in 50% areas	0.009	0.013	0.021	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Assigned to treatment in 75% areas	–0.015	0.007	0.061**	–0.016
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.021)
Assigned to treatment in 100% areas	0.010	0.025**	0.021	0.028**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)
25% areas	–0.002	–0.015	–0.041**	–0.001
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.013)
50% areas	–0.002	–0.014	–0.026	–0.005
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)
75% areas	0.016	–0.006	–0.055**	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.024)

Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Crépon et al: Impacts on Hiring in Treatment and Control Group: Males



Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Crépon et al: Impacts on Hiring in *Control Group*, High vs. Low Occupational Penetration



Low (high) kappa is for occupations where the fraction of eligible workers among job seekers in this occupation is in the bottom (top) quartile

Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Crépon et al: Impacts on Hiring in *Control Group*: Males in Weak vs. Normal Local Labor Markets



"Weak labor markets" are later cohorts in regions with unemployment rate above average for the period

Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

Crépon et al: Impacts on Hiring in *Control Group*: Males in High vs. Low Penetration Occupations



Crépon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora et al. 2013

"Market Externalities of Large Unemployment Insurance Extension Programs"

Lalive, Landais, Zweimüller

AER, 2015

Regional Distribution of REBP

With Extended Benefits = Shaded

Without Extended Benefits = White



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Unemployment Durations: Eligibles in Treated vs. Non-Treated Counties



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Unemployment Durations: Ineligibles in Treated vs. Non-Treated Counties



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Unemployment Durations: Ineligibles in Treated vs. Non-Treated Counties

Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Relationship Between Experience and Unemployment Pre-REBP Treatment Years



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Relationship Between Experience and Unemployment During REBP Treatment



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Impacts on Durations on Eligible and Ineligibles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Unemployment duration			Non-empl. duration	Spell >100 wks	Spell >26 wks
A. Treatment effect on eligible unemployed						
β_0	47.13***	43.35***	43.37***	29.17***	0.240***	0.237***
	(5.602)	(5.129)	(5.069)	(5.444)	(0.0293)	(0.0240)
N	267966	262344	262344	232135	262344	262344
B. Externality - all non-eligible unemployed						
γ_0	-2.462***	-1.979***	-3.740***	-2.327***	-0.0130***	-0.0165**
	(0.818)	(0.708)	(0.758)	(0.629)	(0.00311)	(0.00660)
N	267966	262344	262344	232135	262344	262344
C. Externality - non-eligible unemployed below 50						
γ_0	-2.004**	-1.446**	-3.321***	-2.030***	-0.0104***	-0.0166***
	(0.829)	(0.699)	(0.616)	(0.539)	(0.00205)	(0.00526)
N	254934	249894	249894	220754	249894	249894
D. Externality - non-eligible unemployed above 50						
γ_0	-6.638***	-6.124***	-8.862***	-6.913***	-0.0244***	-0.0494***
	(2.156)	(2.194)	(2.226)	(2.100)	(0.00915)	(0.0142)
N	125088	122277	122277	102677	122277	122277

Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Impacts on UE Durations on Ineligibles by Treatment Intensity

Figure 5: Effects of REBP on non-eligible workers by treatment intensity



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Potential Spillovers Among Job Seekers

A. Rigid wages & diminishing returns



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Potential Spillovers Among Job Seekers

B. Flexible wages & close to linear technology



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

Impacts of REBP on Reemployment Wages



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

No Obvious Effect of REBP on Reemployment Wages – Except through Duration

Figure 6: Reemployment wages conditional on duration of unemployment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties



Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller 2015

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Study Finds Jack Shit

A team of scientists at Johns Hopkins University announced Monday that a five-year study examining the link between polyphenols and lower cholesterol rates has found jack shit… "We tried to find a link, but instead we found *bubkes*."

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Departing Obama Tearfully Shoos Away Loyal Drone Following Him Out Of White House

'Go On Now, Git,' Says Former President