

# 14.773: Political Economy of Institutions and Development

Daron Acemoglu and Sara Lowes

Spring 2023

Syllabus – February 6, 2023

**Lecture:** Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:30-12:00 (E51-151)

**Recitation:** Fridays, 4:00-5:00 (E51-395)

**Canvas:** <https://canvas.mit.edu/courses/18465>

## Instructors:

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## Course Description

This course is intended as an introduction to the newly emerging field of political economy of institutions and development. Its purpose is to give you both a sense of the frontier research topics and a good command of the tools in the area. The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the field an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material with \*'s in detail and also discuss the material without \*'s, but in less detail.

**Grading:** The course grade will be a combination of a final exam and 5 problem sets, with 25% weight on problem sets.

## Daron's part of the course

### 1 Introduction

#### 1.1 Does Political Economy Matter? (DA, 1 lecture)

1. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James (2006) "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth" in *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Aghion, Philippe and Durlauf, Steven, eds. Amsterdam; North-Holland.
2. \*Acemoglu, Daron (2003) "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?" *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31, 620-652.

3. Demsetz, Harold (1967) "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," *American Economic Review*, 57, 61-70.
4. Taylor, M Scott (2011) "Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison." *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3162-95.
5. Allen, Robert C. (1982) "The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures," *Economic Journal*, 92, 937-953.
6. La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1998) "Law and Finance," *Journal of Political Economy*, 106, 1113-1155.
7. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James A. (2001) "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review*, 91, 1369-1401.
8. Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James (2002) "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107, 1231-1294.
9. \*Dell, Melissa (2010) "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita," *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
10. \*Jones, Benjamin F. and Olken, Benjamin A. (2005) "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, 835-864.
11. Udry, Christopher and Goldstein, Markus (2008) "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana", *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 116, No. 6, pp. 981-1022.
12. Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi (2005) "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review*, 95, 1190-1213.
13. Pande, Rohini and Udry, Christopher (2005) "Institutions and Development: A View from Below," to appear in the Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Blundell, Richard, Newey, W., and Perrson, Torsten
14. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (2003) *The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?* MIT Press, Cambridge.
15. Acemoglu, Daron (2005) "Constitutions, Politics and Economic Growth: Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*," *Journal of Economic Literature*, XLIII, 1025-1048.

## 2 Distribution and Efficiency

This part of the course will consider how various economic arrangements and policies meant to influence the distribution of resources affect efficiency. The focus is on situations in which a well-defined elite holds political power and political power is not contested.

voting, and will consider an application of voting with multidimensional policy spaces to the problem of clientelism in the context of development economics.

Chapter 22.

### 2.1 Economic Policies under Elite Control (DA, 1 lecture)

1. \* Acemoglu, Daron (2006). “Modelling Inefficient Institutions”, *Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006*.
2. \* Acemoglu, Daron (2009). *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, Princeton University Press, Chapter 22.
3. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective”, *American Political Science Review* 100 (1), pp. 115-131.
4. Fergusson, Leopoldo (2013). “The Political Economy of Rural Property Rights and the Persistence of the Dual Economy”, *Journal of Development Economics* 103, pp. 167-181.
5. \* Acemoglu, Daron (2008). “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies”, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6 (1), pp. 1-44.
6. Olson, Mancur (1982). *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*, Yale University Press.
7. Stasavage, David (2014). “Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise”, *American Political Science Review* 108 (2), pp. 337-354.
8. Stasavage, David (2017). “When Inclusive Institutions Failed: Lessons from the Democratic Revolutions of the Middle Ages”, mimeo.
9. Bergeron, Augustin, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel (2021). “The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC.” Harvard mimeo.

### 2.2 Labor Coercion (DA, 1 lecture)

This literature focuses on one type of economic institution under the domination of one group, coercive labor relations, to provide more insights on how different types of inefficiencies can emerge.

1. \*Brenner, Robert (1976) "Agrarian Class-Structure and Economic-Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," *Past and Present*, 70, 30-75.
2. Aston, T.H. and Philpin, C.H.E. (1987) *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Alexander Wolitzky (2011) "The Economics of Labor Coercion," *Econometrica*, March 2011, 79(2), pp. 555-600.
4. Chwe, Michael (1990) "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," *Economic Journal*, 100, 1109-1121.
5. Basu, Kaushik (1986) "One Kind of Power," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 38, 259-282.
6. Barzel, Yoram (1977) "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 20, 87-110.
7. Bloom, J. (1998) *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Domar, Evsey D. (1970) "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis," *Journal of Economic History*, 30, 18-32.
9. Lagerlöf, N. (2009) "Slavery and Other Property Rights," *Review of Economic Studies*, 76, 319-342.
10. \*Dell, Melissa (2010) "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita," *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
11. \*Naidu, Suresh and Noam Yuchtman (2013) "Coercive Contract Enforcement: Law and the Labor Market in 19th Century Industrial Britain," *American Economic Review*, 103(1), 107-144.
12. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno and James Robinson (2012) "Finding El Dorado: Slavery and Long-run Development in Columbia" *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 40(4), pp. 534-564.

### 3 Dynamics of Political Power

This part of the course turns to how political power evolves and interacts with economic decisions.

### 3.1 Introduction to Dynamic Voting and Constitutional Choice (DA, 1 lecture)

This lecture provides a basic introduction of voting over distributive policies in dynamic models, and contrasts myopic versus non-myopic behavior by voters. It will also introduce ideas related to endogenous institutions and laws. We will focus on dynamic, game-theoretic models.

1. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2008) "Coalition Formation in Nondemocratic Societies." *Review of Economic Studies*, 75: 987-1009.
2. Roberts, Kevin (2005) "Dynamic Voting in Clubs"
3. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (2015) "Political Economy in a Changing World," *Journal of Political Economy*, 123(5): 1038-1086.
4. Alesina, Alberto and Rodrik, Dani (1994) "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109: 465-490.
5. Hassler Jon, Mora, Sevi, Storlesseten, Kjetil and Zilibotti, Fabrizio (2003) "Survival of the Welfare State," *American Economic Review*, 93, 87-112.
6. Krusell, Per and Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor (1996) "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," *Review of Economic Studies* 63, 301-329.
7. Benabou, Roland and Ok, Efe, "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 2001.
8. Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2016) "Reevaluating De Tocqueville: Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy," NBER Working Paper.
9. Mailath, George J., Morris, Stephen and Postelwaite, Andrew (2001) "Laws and Authority,"
10. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2011) "Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs," *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1446-1476.
11. Barbera, Salvador and Jackson, Matthew (2004) "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 1011-1048.
12. Dixit, Avinash, Grossman, Gene M., and Gul, Faruk (2000) "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," *Journal of Political Economy* 108, 531-568.

### 3.2 Review: Dynamic Games (Recitation)

This review lecture will go over the analysis of dynamic games, in particular, differences between Markov Perfect Equilibria and Subgame Perfect Equilibria, their properties and how they can be computed in simple games.

1. \*Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991) *Game Theory*, Cambridge; MIT Press. Chapters 4, 5 and 13.
2. \*Acemoglu, Daron (2008) *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*, Appendix Chapter C.
3. \*Acemoglu, Daron (2005) “Modelling Inefficient Institutions,” *Advances in Economic Theory World Congress 2006*

## 4 Modeling Institutions

This part of the course will focus on using the insights from the previous part to develop political economy models of institutions where we study simultaneously the consequences and the origins of institutions.

### 4.1 Political Economy of Weak States and State Building (DA, 2 lectures)

These lectures will discuss the role of the state and how weak states can become a barrier to economic development. They will then turn to see how and under what circumstances states form and why weak states persist.

1. Tilly, Charles (1990) *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, Blackwell, Cambridge MA.
2. Mann, Michael (1986) *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
3. Evans, Peter (1989) “Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” *Sociological Forum*. 4(4):561-587 (December, 1989)
4. \*Gennaioli, Nicola and Ilija Rainer (2007) “The Modern Impact of Pre-Colonial Centralization in Africa”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3), 185-234.
5. \*Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou (2013) “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development”, *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113–152.
6. Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda and Louis Putterman (2002) “States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 7: 347-69.

7. Tilly, Charles (1985) "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol eds. *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press.
8. Gennaioli, Nicola and Hans-Joachim Voth (2015) "State Capacity and Military Conflict" *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 1409-1448.
9. Herbst, Jeffery I. (2000) *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
10. Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten (2011) *Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters*, Princeton University Press.
11. Osafo-Kwaako, Philip and James A. Robinson (2013) "Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial Africa," , *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41(1), 534-564.
12. Blair, Robert (2013) "Peacebuilding and State Legitimacy: Evidence from Two Lab in the Field Experiments in Liberia" Yale mimeo.
13. \*Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul (2018) "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo" forthcoming *Journal of Political Economy*.
14. \* Balan, Pablo, Bergeron, Augustin, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel (2020). "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the DR Congo." forthcoming *American Economic Review*.
15. Acemoglu, Daron (2005) "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States" *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52, 1199-1226.
16. \*Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2009) "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics", *American Economic Review*, 99(4), 1218-44.
17. \*Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2018) "The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States" mimeo.
18. \*Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2019) *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin, New York, Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 9.
19. Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson (2016) "Paths to Inclusive Political Institutions" *Economic History of Warfare and State Formation, Essays in Honor of Mark Harrison*, Springer Singapore, 3-50.
20. Waldner, David (1999) *State-Building and Late Development*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

21. Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James A. Robinson (2015). “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 105, No. 8, pp. 2364-2409.
22. Koyama, Mark, Chiaki Moriguchi, and Tuan-Hwee Sng (2015). “Geopolitics and Asia’s Little Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of State Building in China and Japan after 1850 ” unpublished, George Mason University.

## 4.2 Democratization and Persistence (DA, 2 lectures)

These two lectures will first provide a basic model of nondemocratic politics and highlight central commitment problems involved in such interactions. It will then introduce the basic models of institutional change in the context of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic politics. Finally, it will discuss various ways in which the distribution of power may persist despite institutional change.

1. \*Acemoglu, Daron, *Lecture Notes*, Chapters 17, 18 and 20.
2. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 5 and 6.
3. \*North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R. (1989) “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, *Journal of Economic History*, 49, 803-832.
4. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2000) “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CXV, 1167-1199.
5. \*Aidt, Toke S. and Peter S. Jensen (2013) “Workers of the World Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938,” University of Cambridge mimeo.
6. Collins, William and Robert A. Margo (2007) “The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from Property Values” *Journal of Economic History*, 67(4), 849-883.
7. \*Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger and David Yanagizawa-Drott 2013) “the Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(4), 1633-1685.
8. Llavador, Humberto and Oxoby, Robert J. (2005) “Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, 1155-1192.



9. Jack, William and Lagunoff, Roger (2006) "Dynamic Enfranchisement," *Journal of Public Economics*, 90(4-5), 551-572
10. Moore, Barrington (1966) *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston MA.
11. Lagunoff, Roger (2006) "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions"
12. Lagunoff, Roger (2006) "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions,"
13. Arthur, W. Brian. (1989) "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In by Historical Events," *Economic Journal*, 1989, 99(1), pp. 106-131.
14. Coate, Stephen and Morris, Stephen E. (1999) "Policy Persistence." *American Economic Review*, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1327-1336.
15. Page, Scott (2006) "Path Dependence," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1, 87-115.
16. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2008) "Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions," *American Economic Review* 98(1), 267-291.
17. Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo (2013) "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution," *British Journal of Political Science*.
18. \*Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2008) "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," *American Economic Review*, 98, 1737-65.
19. \*Anderson, Siwan, Patrick François and Ashok Kotwal (2015) "Clientelism in Indian Villages," *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1780-1816.
20. Thelen, Kathleen (2004) *How institutions evolve: the political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan*, New York; Cambridge University Press.
21. Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005) "A drawback of electoral competition." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3 (4), 1318-1348.
22. Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010) "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States," *Journal of European Economic Association*, 9(2), pp. 177-208.
23. Horacio Larreguy (2012) "Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico" mimeo.

24. François, Patrick, Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi (2015) “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica*, 83(2), 465–503.
25. \*Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik (2012) “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?” *Review of Economic Studies*.

## 5 Beliefs, Norms and Institutions

This part of the course turns to the interplay between beliefs, norms and political choices.

### 5.1 Beliefs, Information and Politics (DA, 1 lecture)

This lecture will discuss the two-way interaction between between voting and beliefs, shaped by learning.

1. \*Piketty, Thomas, (1995) “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110: 551-584.
2. Austen-Smith, David (1991) “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters,” *Economics and Politics*, 3:73-92.
3. Fedderson, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996) “The Swing Voter’s Curse,” *American Economic Review*, 86: 408-424.
4. Fey, Mark and J. Kim (2002) “The Swing Voter’s Curse: A Comment,” *American Economic Review*, 92: 1264-1268.
5. \*Strulovici, Bruno (2010) “Voting and Experimentation,” *Econometrica*.
6. Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin (2012) “A Political Theory of Populism,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(2), pp. 771-805.
7. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Alexander Wolitzky (2014) “Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model” *American Economic Review*.

### 5.2 Culture, Norms and Political Economy (DA, 3 lectures)

These three lectures will discuss some of the recent evidence suggesting persistence of culture and values, and recent models of culture and endogenous beliefs and how they interact with political economy and cooperation in society.

1. \*Greif, Avner (1994) “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 102, 912-950.

2. \*Tabellini, Guido (2008) "Culture and Institutions." *Journal of European Economic Association*, 2008, 255-294.
3. Tabellini, Guido (2010) "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe." *Journal of European Economic Association*, 8, 677-716.
4. \*Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2006) "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20, 23-48.
5. Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2009) "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124, 1095-1131.
6. \*Fernandez, Raquel and Alessandra Fogli (2009) "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work and Fertility," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1, 146-177.
7. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2019) *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Penguin, New York, Chapters 2, 4 and 6.
8. \* Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2021) "Culture, Institutions and Social Equilibria: A Framework" NBER Working Paper, 28832.
9. \* Swidler, Ann (1986). "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies" *American Sociological Review*, 273-286.
10. Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James A. Robinson and Jonathan Weigel (2015) "Understanding Ethnic Identity in Africa: Evidence from the Implicit Association Test" NBER working paper.
11. Roland, Gerard and Yury Gorodnichenko (2017) "Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(3), 402-416.
12. \*Voth, Hans-Joachim and Nico Voigtlander (2012) "Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Antisemitic Violence in Nazi Germany" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
13. \*Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and James Robinson (2014) "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone" *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2): 319-368.
14. Voth, Hans-Joachim, Shanker Satyanath and Nico Voigtlander (2014) "Bowling for Fascism" NBER working paper.
15. \*Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2001) "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97, 298-319.

16. Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000) “Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115, 955-988.
17. \*Tabellini, Guido (2008) “The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, 905-950.
18. Doepke, Matthias and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2008) “Occupational Mobility in the Spirit of Capitalism,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, 747-793.
19. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Matthew Jackson (2015) “History and Expectations in the Evolution of Cooperation,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 82: 423-456.
20. Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2011) “Laws and Social Norms” mimeo.
21. \*Acemoglu, Daron and Matthew Jackson (2016) “Norms and the Enforcement of Laws” *Journal of the European Economic Association*.
22. Heldring, Leander (2016) “Violence and the State: Evidence from Rwanda’s Decade of Atrocities” mimeo.

## Sara’s part of the course

### Introduction and overview

1. Nunn, Nathan. 2022. “On the Dynamics of Human Behavior: The Past, Present, and Future of Culture, Conflict, and Cooperation,” *American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings*, 112: 15–37.
2. Nunn, Nathan. 2021. “History as Evolution,” *Handbook of Historical Economics*, Alberto Bisin and Giovanni Federico (eds). North Holland: 41–91.
3. Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. 2020. “Historical Legacies and African Development,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 58 (1): 53–128.
4. Alesina, Alberto and Paola Giuliano. 2015. “Culture and Institutions,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53 (4): 898–944.

## 6 Historical Determinants: Slave Trades (April 4)

1. (\*) Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa,” *American Economic Review*, 101(7): 3221–3252.
2. (\*) Nunn, Nathan. 2008. “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123 (1): 139–176.

3. Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga. 2012. “Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94 (1): 20–36.
4. Teso, Eduardo. 2018. “The Long-Term Effects of Demographic Shocks on the Evolution of Gender Roles: Evidence from the TransAtlantic Slave Trade,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 17 (2): 497–534.
5. Inikori, Joseph. 2000. “Africa and the Trans-Atlantic Trade,” In Toyin Falola (ed.) *Africa: Volume I, African History Before 1885*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
6. Fenske, James. and Namrata Kala. 2015. “Climate and the Slave Trade,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 112: 19–32.

## 7 Historical Determinants: Colonial Contact (April 6)

1. (\*) Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa,” *American Economic Review*, 106 (7), 1802–1848.
2. (\*) Lowes, Sara and Eduardo Montero. 2021. “Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 136, No. 4, pp. 2047-2091.
3. (\*) Wantchekon, Leonard, Marko Klasnja, and Natalija Novta. 2015. “Education and Human Capital Externalities: Evidence from Colonial Benin,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130: 703–757.
4. Lowes, Sara and Eduardo Montero. 2021. “The Legacy of Colonial Medicine in Central Africa,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 111, No. 4, pp. 1284-1314.
5. Arthur Blouin. 2022. “Culture and Contracts: The Historical Legacy of Forced Labour,” *Economic Journal*, 132 (641): 89–105.
6. Archibong, Belinda and Nonso Obikili. 2021. “Prison Labor: The Price of Prisons and the Lasting Effects of Incarceration,” Working paper, Columbia University.
7. Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. 2014. “National Institutions and Sub-national Development in Africa,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129 (1): 151–213.
8. Huillery, Elise. 2009. “History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2): 176–215.
9. Jedwab, Remi and Alexander Moradi. 2016. “The Permanent Effects of Transportation Revolutions in Poor Countries: Evidence from Africa,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 98 (2): 268–284.

10. Nunn, Nathan. 2014. "Gender and Missionary Influence in Colonial Africa," In Emmanuel Akyeampong, Robert H. Bates, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson (eds) *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–512.

## 8 Social Structure and Kinship (April 11)

1. (\*) Moscona, Jacob, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson. 2020. "Segmentary Lineage Organization and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Econometrica*, 88 (5): 1999–2036.
2. (\*) Jakiela, Pamela and Owen Ozier (2015) "Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies," *Review of Economic Studies*.
3. (\*) Alsan, Marcella. 2015. "The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development," *American Economic Review*, 105(1), 382–410.
4. Moscona, Jacob and Awa Ambra Seck. 2023. "Age Set vs. Kin: Culture and Financial Ties in East Africa," Working paper, Harvard University.
5. Squires, Munir. 2019. "Kinship Taxation as a Constraint to Microenterprise Growth: Experimental Evidence from Kenya," Working paper, University of British Columbia.
6. Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. 2013. "Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development," *Econometrica*, 81 (1), 113–152.
7. Gneezy, Uri, Kenneth L. Leonard and John A. List (2009) "Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society," *Econometrica*, 77(5), 1637–166.
8. Gennaioli, Nicola, and Ilija Rainer. 2007. "The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12 (3), 185–234.
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